

PART EIGHT

THE GOLDEN AGE OF SCHOLASTICISM

The second half of the thirteenth century can be called the classical period in the development of mediaeval scholasticism. It corresponds to the moment when, fully conscious of the nature of the task that lay ahead of them and provided with the material required to perform it, some theologians succeeded in building up complete theological syntheses, for instance, Saint Bonaventure and Saint Thomas Aquinas. It was their privilege to achieve their work at a time when, although anybody could see that a crisis was brewing, it had not yet taken place. There is, in the writings of these masters, and especially in their earlier ones, a sort of serenity born of the confidence felt by their authors that, if properly understood, philosophy was on the side of theology and reason in fundamental harmony with revelation. The commentary of Bonaventure on the *Sentences* was completed, at the latest, in 1255; Thomas Aquinas completed the Third Part of the *Summa*, up to qu. XC, in 1273; both died in 1274, three years before the doctrinal storm of 1277 which brought the summer of scholasticism to an end. Even the theological style of these fifty years can be said to be classical in its own order. The technique of the "question" has been perfectly mastered; the language of the theologians and of the philosophers has become both precise and supple and no writers have ever said more with a stricter economy of words. Historians have created a different reputation for them, but among those who judge the language of the great scholastics, how many can understand its meaning?

CHAPTER I

THE FRANCISCAN SCHOOL

ALEXANDER was born in England, at Hales, probably Hales Owen (Shropshire), slightly before 1186. He was about fifteen years old when he went to Paris in order to complete his first education. After the six years of studies required from future teachers, he became a "regent" at the University, at the age of twenty-one, in 1206-1207. From the Faculty of Arts, he went over to the Faculty of Theology where he became a "master," probably in 1220-1221. He was one of the first masters to teach a commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, whose text had recently been approved by the Lateran Council (1215). After two years of interruption (1229-1231), Alexander resumed his teaching at the University of Paris (1231-1232) and entered the Franciscan Order about the beginning of the school year 1236-1237. He then was at least fifty years old. This decision gave to the Franciscans their first chair at the University and became the origin of the Franciscan school of theology at Paris. There is no decisive reason to think that Alexander did not carry his teaching up to the date of his death, August 21, 1245.¹

I. ALEXANDER OF HALES AND JOHN OF LA ROCHELLE

The name of Alexander is linked to a monumental work of which Roger Bacon has said in his *Shorter Work* (*Opus minus*) that the Franciscans "attributed to him that great *Summa*, heavier than a horse, although it had not been done by him, but by others." Modern historians admit that Bacon was largely right. The so-called *Summa of Brother Alexander* certainly contains elements borrowed from his authentic works, but even these are often either abbreviated or enlarged: for the rest, it is a compilation, probably undertaken by John of la Rochelle and completed by later Franciscan theologians. It already existed about 1250, but what its composition may have been at that date is not known. Under its present form, it includes extracts from John of la Rochelle, Bonaventure, William of Meliton, etc. This does not mean that the *Summa* is of no historical interest. Despite its composite character, it has a unity of its own, due to the fact that its component fragments are all borrowed from Franciscan theologians belonging to the same doctrinal school. Owing to this unity of inspiration, it remarkably illustrates what may be called "the spirit of the thirteenth-century Franciscan school of theology at the University of Paris." Even as a collective work, it has a distinct signification.

Apart from the *Summa*, some authentic works of Alexander have now been published. In his glosses on the First Book of Peter Lombard,

Alexander appears to us as hesitating between two mental universes. On the one hand, he freely draws from Aristotle, and not only from his logical writings, but also from his *De anima*, *Physics*, *De coelo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, *De animalium generatione*, *De motu animalium*, *De juventute et senectute*, *De somno et vigilia*, *Metaphysics*, etc. In short, at the time when he wrote his own commentary on Lombard (1220-1225), Alexander had practically the whole doctrine of Aristotle at his disposal. On the other hand, his main theological authorities were Saint Augustine, Denis, Boethius and many eleventh- and twelfth-century theologians, such as Anselm, Alan of Lille (*Regulae*), Bernard of Clairvaux, Gilbertus Porretanus, William of Conches, the pseudo-hermetic *Book of the Twenty-four Philosophers*, Richard of Saint Victor, etc. There is little evidence of sustained controversies with his own contemporaries in the texts of Alexander which we know. His work seems to belong to a time when no collective theological effort was yet being made in order to assimilate the newly discovered Aristotelian world.

The "Distinctions" of Alexander on the *Sentences* already resemble the "articles" that will constitute the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas. Their structure is simple: 1) statement of the question (*Quaeritur an . . .*); 2) a choice of objections against the intended answer (*Videtur quod non . . .*); 3) affirmation of the answer on the strength of a theological authority (*Sed contra . . .*); 4) justification of the answer (*Respondetur . . .*); 5) refutation of the objections. Not all the Distinctions of Alexander exhibit this perfect structure, but many do. The scholastic "Question," which is the organic cell of all the scholastic Commentaries on the *Sentences*, Disputed Questions, Quodlibetic Questions and *Summae theologiae*, is already present in the glosses of Alexander of Hales.

Like all his contemporaries, and some of his successors, Alexander had no clear idea of the true meaning of the philosophy of Aristotle. He repeatedly quoted the *Liber de Causis* as an authentic work of the Philosopher. His sketchy arguments in favor of the existence of God can hardly be called demonstrations (p. 40), although we should remember that these notes of a professor in view of his lectures do not represent the full oral development: "Every mobile, taken as such, presupposes some supreme immobile principle, otherwise one should proceed *in infinitum*." Likewise, nothing of that which is can hold its being from itself; other wise, being would have no term, and, from this the existence of a supreme being can be inferred." A no less short argument proves that, since nothing is good by itself, there must be a supreme good. Thus, Alexander says, "in reasoning, our intellect always strives to reach that which does not exist in virtue of something else" (p. 40). Even adding to these assertions other arguments borrowed from John Damascene and from Anselm of Canterbury (whose *Proslogion* he quotes as the *De personis logicis* that is, "on the divine persons"), we still remain very far from the

speculations of Saint Bonaventure on the divine being. It is a curious fact that a man so full of Augustine, whom he never tires of quoting, does not think of resorting to the remarkable demonstrations of the existence of God which he had at his disposal.

The treatment of psychological notions, inserted in the commentary on the occasion of the doctrine of the image of God in man, is strictly Augustinian, or inspired of such pseudo-Augustinian sources as the *De spiritu et anima*. Against William of Auxerre, Alexander maintains that the powers of the soul are one with its substance. Not, however, with its essence, because, since essence is that by which the soul is what it is, its powers are not what makes the soul to be a soul; on the contrary, since substance is what makes a thing subsist in its indivisible unity, the soul cannot be complete without its powers or faculties (p. 65). This position of the problem will remain characteristic of the Franciscan school up to the time of Duns Scotus. The theological interest at stake was that, for a true Augustinian, it could not be "accidental" to the human soul to be a created trinity, that is, an image of God.

Alexander follows Augustine in his discussion of the problem of evil (pp. 68-73); Boethius on the distinction of *quo est* and *quod est* (p. 105, with shades of difference in interpretation); Augustine again concerning the notion of wisdom (p. 468), and, indeed, practically everywhere, without betraying any eagerness to go beyond the theological statement of his positions in order to elaborate properly philosophical interpretations of their meaning. To repeat, Alexander of Hales cannot be judged on the sole basis of this early commentary. Yet, since no other certainly authentic documents are at present available, we can only see him as the origin of a theological movement which rapidly went beyond its initiator. His first disciples probably knew, between the years 1220 and 1245, a more mature Alexander, whose teaching they incorporated into the *Summa fratris Alexandri* and into their own works. This supposition agrees better than the text of his commentary with the repeatedly-made statement of his immediate successors, including Saint Bonaventure himself, that they felt indebted to him for their whole theological teaching.

Such was, for instance, the case, with John of la Rochelle,² a disciple and younger colleague of Alexander at the University of Paris, who died a few months before his master, on February 8, 1245. In addition to several theological works (*Summa de virtutibus*, *Summa de vitiis*, *Summa de articulis fidei*) he left a *Summa de anima* which shows him to be imbued with a very highly developed philosophical spirit. He himself, in one of his sermons, alludes to the hostility of those who were at that time making every effort to stifle theological studies, and attributes it openly to the influence of Satan who does not want Christians to have cultivated minds.

As he conceives it with Avicenna, the rational soul is a simple substance, capable of vivifying the body and accomplishing multiple operations in it.³ Simple in its essence,⁴ the soul is multiple as to the several different powers whose operations it exercises either with the body without it. In order to recognize them, it is sufficient to observe the distinction of their objects. From there one goes on to the distinction of their operations, and then to that of their natures. His classification of faculties follows almost exactly that of the Augustinian apocrypha: *spiritu et anima* and places at their peak, beyond the intellect which knows the created intelligibles (angels, souls), the intelligence (*intellectus*) which knows the true and the immovable good, that is, God. The following ascending scale of faculties is thus obtained: the senses perceive the body; the imagination, the similitudes of bodies; reason, the nature of bodies; intellect, created spirits; intelligence, the uncreated Spirit. Sensations result from the action exerted on the organs by bodies thanks to the intermediary of physical media, which are the diaphanous for sight, air for hearing, vapors exhaled by objects for the sense of smell, saliva for taste, flesh for touch. The data from those particular senses are centralized by the "common sense," here described as a charge of preserving them and combining them to form the "common sensibles" (that is to say, common to several senses), such as movement, rest, number and so on. Common sense, which Avicenna calls *sensus formalis*, is an internal sense. In order to disengage abstract notions from common images, the intellectual faculty (*virtus intellectiva*) is required, which is bound to no particular organ, but is completely present in the whole body: *est in toto corpore tota*.⁵ Abstraction does not consist in really separating the constitutive elements of the object, but in considering them separately, thanks to an appreciation (*aestimatio*) which distinguishes them from one another by grouping the resemblances, eliminating the differences, but without cutting them completely off from the sensible: "On the contrary, the intellectual faculty apprehends the corporeal form, stripped of all the particularities of matter and of very singularity, and it apprehends it thus itself, naked, simple and universal . . . In fact, if it were not thus stripped of all the rest by consideration of the intellect, it could not be known as a common predicate of all the individuals. These degrees in the order of abstraction from the body should therefore be distinguished: first, in the senses; secondly, in the imagination; thirdly, in the cogitative (*cogitatio*); fourthly, in the intellect."⁶

In spite of the influence of the *De spiritu et anima*, and of Avicenna's psychology, this doctrine represents rather well what was commonly retained of Aristotle's teaching; but John of la Rochelle wished in addition to reconcile the Greco-Arabian doctrine of the agent intellect with the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination. He expressly recog-

in each human soul, the Aristotelian distinction of the possible intellect (in potency with regard to intelligibles, like a tablet on which nothing is yet written), and of the agent intellect which is in our soul as the intelligible light of God himself, and always in act. Aristotelianism is thereby winning a decisive victory, since John of la Rochelle, like Albert the Great and Saint Thomas Aquinas, but contrary to William of Auvergne, is here attributing to every human soul, taken individually, an agent intellect proper to it, which is in it as the mark God left upon his handiwork. This intellect, John says, is the highest faculty of the soul: *intellectus agens, id est vis animae suprema*, and we need nothing else in order to know either the material beings external to us, or the faculties and operations of our soul, or even the primary principles of natural knowledge. From that moment, at least in all essentials, the bases of an Aristotelian and Thomist theory of knowledge are already laid down. The fact that John of la Rochelle seems nevertheless to admit one or several other separate agent intellects is not hard to explain. He simply desires to impart a Christian meaning to the Avicennian doctrine of the separate Intelligences. Each of them can be called an agent Intellect, since it is a spiritual substance, distinct from the soul, superior to it and capable of acting upon it to confer on it gratuitously and from without forms of knowledge that it could not acquire by its natural light. In this sense, God and the angels can be considered as so many separate agent Intellects, the angels to instruct man in what concerns the angels, God to instruct him in supernatural truths like the Trinity, which concern only God. These verbal concessions entail no modification of the doctrine. If we add that John of la Rochelle rejects Gabirol's thesis on the composition of matter and form in the human soul and in angels, we shall doubtless feel inclined to see in his psychology the manifest proof of the profound influence exerted by Aristotle, as early as the first half of the thirteenth century, even on some Franciscan masters, but Saint Bonaventure's doctrine was soon to rally his contemporaries, especially within the Franciscan Order, around the principles of Saint Augustine.

2. BONAVENTURE AND HIS SCHOOL

The spirituality of Saint Bonaventure has exercised a decisive influence on the choice he made of a set of philosophical positions as well as on his way of handling them.⁷ First and foremost a theologian, he was clearly conscious of the new type of learning represented by what we today call scholasticism and he has left us one of its most perfect descriptions. Since the subject matter of theology is what a Christian must "believe," its formal-reason is to be the object of a possible act of faith; let us call this, by nature, something "believable," or "credible." The proper task of theology, conceived as a discipline distinct from

simple faith, then, is to render "intelligible" this "credible" by adding reason to it. As he says in the first question of the Prologue to his commentary on the *Sentences*: the subject matter of theology is the believable turned into intelligible owing to an addition of reasoning (*credibile, prout tamen credibile transit in rationem intelligibilem, et hoc per additamentum rationis*). To study what may be called the "philosophy of Saint Bonaventure" is first of all to abstract from his theological speculation the rational elements which he intentionally added to faith in order to achieve its understanding. Here again, as in the case of all his contemporaries, abstraction entails no separation. The connecting link between faith and reason is love. The human soul is destined to enjoy the infinite good which is God. This supreme good is now confusedly and obscurely grasped by man through faith; for a rational being, nothing is more desirable than to understand what he firmly believes and loves; thus, because theology is born of an effort to understand faith, a new rational speculation arises from it.

A. God

This theological speculation finds itself confronted with different objects. Some exceed the power of human reason and belong to theological speculation alone because they necessarily require faith at the origin of argumentation. When the starting point either is, or includes, an act of faith, philosophy can still be put to good use by the theologian, but his conclusions are irrelevant to philosophy. On the contrary, when natural reason can grasp a certain object, then, even though it may be offered to man as a "credible," this object retains the formal reason of "intelligible" as common to all objects of rational speculation. To express in concrete terms this general attitude, let us say that, in the mind of Saint Bonaventure, faith leads the way and reason is its fellow traveler. At a certain point, reason has to stop, because it ceases to see what faith is still able to grasp. Up to that point, however, reason is able to see, in its own light, something of what revelation offers us to believe. The larger part of these naturally knowable truths included in theological learning are related to God and to man, that is, to man and to his ultimate end.

Saint Bonaventure's doctrine can be characterized as an "itinerary of the soul toward God," or, rather, up to him. It teaches "how man goes to God through other things." Accordingly, his outlook on man and things will be dominated by a twofold tendency; first, to conceive the sensible world as the road that leads to God; next, to conceive man as a creature naturally open to the divine light and God as revealing himself to man through the whole gamut of his illuminations. The mystical trend of the doctrine is immediately apparent to the reader of Saint Bonaventure; accounts for his effort to retain as much as he could of the doctrines of Augustine and of Denis even while speaking the language of Aristotle.

As has already been seen, he was not the first theologian to do so; nor was he to be the last one, but he has done it in a particularly systematic and consistent way.

It is possible to find God by considering his creatures, because the truth of things consists in their representing the primary and supreme truth. In this sense, all creatures are so many ways to God. Their resemblance to him is not a sharing in his own being; it is but a resemblance or imitation which can be a faithful one only to the extent that the finite can resemble the infinite. To describe it by a technical term, let us say that it is a resemblance of "expression," as a spoken word expresses its meaning. Considered from this point of view, therefore, what we call creatures, or things, constitute a sort of language, and the whole universe is only a book in which the Trinity is read on every page (*creatura mundi est quasi quidam liber in quo legitur Trinitas fabricatrix*).⁸ And if one were to ask why God created the world on this plan, the answer would be very simple: the world has no other reason for being than to give utterance to God; it is a book which was written only that it might be read by man and be the unceasing reminder of its Author's love. Since the First Cause has made the world in order to manifest itself, the illuminative way will go back over the course of things in order to raise us up to the God whose expression they are.

Three principal stages will mark the moments of that ascension. The first consists in finding the *shadows* and *vestiges* of God in the sensible world; the second consists in seeking his *image* in our soul; the third goes beyond created things and brings us into the mystical delights of the knowledge and adoration of God.⁹

To find God again, thanks to the vestiges he has left in things, is to "enter into the way of God," and it is also to find in passing all the proofs of his existence one ordinarily derives from considering corporeal reality. But what characterizes Saint Bonaventure's attitude is that he scarcely stops over the technique of their elaboration; he urges us directly to perceive God present in the movement, order, measure, beauty and disposition of things; still better, he manifestly thinks that we can arrive at the existence of God no matter what we start with, so that, for a cleansed mind and heart, every object and every aspect of each object betrays the secret presence of its creator. That is why the dialectic of the *Itinerary* tends to multiply the points of view from which we perceive God rather than to constrain us to reach him through a small number of channels. It is a question, fundamentally, of not having scales on our eyes; when the scales fall from our eyes, we see God everywhere. The splendor of things reveals him to us if we are not blind; they proclaim him aloud and will awaken us if we are not deaf; one must, in fact, be dumb not to praise God in each of his operations and mad not to recognize the primary principle by so many indications.

And yet that is still but the first degree of the ascension, and all these clarities are still only shadows. The proofs through the sensible world that he gives us as blinding evidence seem to Saint Bonaventure to be nothing more than exercises of the mind when he thinks of the more decisive proofs offered us by that image of God, our soul. In considering the sensible world we can in fact find in it a sort of shadow of God, for all the properties of things require a cause: we can also see his traces in it by seeking in the unity, truth and goodness they possess the mark of their efficient, formal and final cause; but in both cases we turn our backs, so to speak, on the divine light whose reflection is all we seek in things. By seeking God in our soul, we turn directly to God himself; what makes us find in it not only a shadow, or a mark, but the very image of God, is that he is not only its Cause, but even its Object.

Notice that the idea of God is, in fact, implied in the simplest of our intellectual operations. In order fully to define any particular substance, higher and higher principles must be called upon until the idea of self-subsisting being is arrived at, for indeed, unless we know what being is in itself, we cannot fully know the definition of any particular being. Our intellect only manages, therefore, fully to grasp its objects thanks to the idea of being, pure, total and absolute; it is the presence in us of the idea of the perfect and the absolute which permits us to know the particular as imperfect and relative.

But let us go still further. Not only could our changing and uncertain intellect not apprehend without God's help the immutable and necessary truths, as Saint Augustine had already shown, but it even finds God directly each time we go deeply enough into ourselves. Our intellect is joined to the eternal truth itself; we have within us the image of God naturally infused. Just as we directly know our soul and its operations, so we know God without the help of exterior senses.¹⁰ If, then, there seemed to be no evidence of the existence of God, that could only be for lack of reflection on our part. If concupiscence and sensible images do not intercept their veils between truth and us, it becomes evident that it is useless to prove that God exists.

It is easily conceivable that such a theologian should welcome Saint Anselm's ontological proof and incorporate it just as it was in his own doctrine. Perhaps one might even say that for the first time that argument takes on its full value, and places its reliance on a full knowledge of the conditions it presupposes, in the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor. The fact is that in this case we are no longer affirming the presence of God because we are gaining knowledge of it; we know God, on the contrary, because he is eminently present to us: *Deus praesentissimus est ipsi animae et ipso cognoscibilis*.¹¹ If God's presence is the basis of our knowledge of him it goes without saying that the very notion we have of God implies his existence. It implies it precisely because the impossibility of our thinking

that God is not, is in us the immediate effect of the intrinsic necessity for his existence: *tanta est veritas divini esse, quod cum assensu non potest cogitari non esse*. It is, therefore, the intrinsic necessity of God himself which, constantly illuminating our soul, makes it impossible for us to think that God is not, or to maintain that without contradiction. To become aware of this fact is to see that the very notion of God implies his existence. Since he is being pure and simple, immutable and necessary, it is one and the same thing to say that God is God, or to say that he exists: *si Deus est Deus, Deus est*.¹²

It goes without saying that Saint Bonaventure does not thereby attribute to us a clear concept of the divine essence. What is found to be inseparable from, and profoundly imprinted upon, our own thought is the affirmation of the existence of God, and not to the slightest degree the comprehension of his essence. Saint Bonaventure was quite aware of the very precise objections which, ever since the time of Gaunilon, theologians had leveled at the ontological argument, but he considered them irrelevant. Hugh of Saint Victor had already said that God proportioned our knowledge of him in such a way that we could never either know *what* he is, or not know *that* he is.¹³ Such also is the formula that Saint Bonaventure adopts, agreeing on this point with tradition.

We could go beyond this second stage of the "Itinerary of the soul toward God," and ask of mystical contemplation the ineffable joys of the divine presence, but in overstepping the limit of what can be expressed in words we would be leaving philosophy. Here, says Saint Bonaventure himself, we must concede little to word and pen, and grant everything to the gift of God, that is, to the Holy Ghost. Let us then leave these lofty regions and ask ourselves rather what conception of the human soul and of knowledge implied such proofs of the existence of God.

B. The Soul

The soul is essentially one, but its faculties, or powers, vary according to the nature of the objects to which it applies. This is possible because the soul itself is at one and the same time an intelligible substance complete in itself, to such a point that it can survive the death of the body, and the form of the organic body it animates. Insofar as it animates the body, it exercises its sensitive functions in the sensory organs. Sensitive knowledge includes first an action exerted by some exterior object and undergone by a sensory organ. Moreover—and Bonaventure here cedes to Aristotle the ground Augustine occupied—the soul itself spiritually undergoes that action, inasmuch precisely as it is the quickener of the body; but it immediately reacts, in bringing a judgment (*judicium*) to bear on the action. It has just undergone, and it is this very judgment which is sensible knowledge. Bonaventure seems, therefore, to wish to reconcile the Aristotelian doctrine of sensation conceived as a passion undergone by the human

compound with the Augustinian and Plotinian theory of sensation conceived as an action of the soul.¹⁴

Sensible images are the data from which the intellect gets its intelligible knowledge. Abstraction is the work of the possible intellect which, turning toward these images, carries out the necessary operations for retaining only the common and universal element of these particular data. It seems that Saint Bonaventure confines himself to the purely psychological plane of abstraction conceived as an effort of attention to classify and order sensible data according to the laws of reason. The possible intellect, for him, is not then pure potentiality, which would be confusing it with matter; it is an active faculty of the intellect which prepares intelligible notions and gathers them up. It is called "possible" because, of itself alone, it would not be equal to that task. Each human soul possesses, in addition to its own possible intellect, its own agent intellect whose function is to illuminate the possible intellect and render it capable of effecting abstraction. This implies that just as the possible intellect is not devoid of all actuality, the agent intellect is not exempt from all potentiality. A pure act, it would be the separate agent Intelligence which Avicenna describes, and which Bonaventure well knows, but which he does not want at any price.¹⁵ Agent intellect and possible intellect are fundamentally two distinct functions of one and the same soul in its effort to assimilate what there is intelligible in the sensible.

This effort of abstraction, furthermore, is not always necessary; it is required only when our thought turns its "lower face" toward the body in order to acquire scientific knowledge of it, not when it turns its "upper face" toward the intelligible to acquire wisdom. In fact, the intellect must have recourse to sensible knowledge in order to know everything foreign to its own spiritual nature, that is to say, in order to know everything which is not itself and God. All the products of the mechanical arts and all natural objects are foreign to its own nature; the knowledge of the former is foreign to it as exterior, the knowledge of the latter is foreign to it as inferior, and for both of them the intervention of the senses is needed. But it is quite another thing when the intellect is turned toward the soul, which is always present to it, and toward God, who is still more present. It is not Aristotle who prevails this time, but Plato. From the moment we go beyond sensible objects to raise ourselves up to intelligible truths, we call upon an inner light which is perceived in the principles of the sciences and the natural truth innate in man. The soul itself, the principles of philosophy which it contains, and the divine light which makes us know them, spring from a loftier order of knowledge in which sensibility has no part. Saint Bonaventure here is not confusing two philosophies whose fundamental oppositions might be unknown to him; he is, on the contrary, in full awareness of what he is doing, attempting a synthesis of Plato and Aristotle. Let us be more exact, he believes he is promoting the tradition of

a synthesis which the genius of Saint Augustine had already achieved. Aristotle knew how to speak the language of science, and he clearly saw, contrary to Plato, that human knowledge has not the intelligible world of ideas for its object; but Plato spoke the language of wisdom in affirming the existence of the eternal reasons and Ideas; Augustine, enlightened by the Holy Ghost, could speak both languages: *uterque autem sermo, scilicet sapientiae et scientiae, per Spiritum datus est Augustino*.¹⁶

If Saint Augustine had been able to realize this synthesis, it was thanks to his doctrine of the illumination of the intellect by the Ideas of God. Saint Bonaventure made that doctrine his and transmitted it to his school. It consists essentially in explaining the presence of necessary truths in human thought by the direct and immediate action of divine Ideas on our intellect. The usual formula of the problem, in Saint Bonaventure's works, consists in asking how the human intellect can attain an absolutely certain knowledge (*certitudinalis cognitio*). Such knowledge presents two characteristics: it is immutable as concerns the object known and infallible as concerns the subject knowing. Now, man is neither an infallible knowing subject, nor are the objects he attains immutable in nature. If, therefore, the human intellect possesses intellectual certitudes, it is because the divine Ideas themselves, which are immutable intelligibles, illumine the human intellect in its knowledge of such objects. The Ideas do not come in here as objects seen, for they are God himself, a sight of whom is inaccessible to us here below; they act upon the human intellect by immediate contact, but they exercise upon it a simply regulative action. Thanks to them, we see not only *what is*, but the agreement or disagreement of what is with *what should be*. Because the divine Ideas judge our intellect, it in turn becomes capable of judging things.

It would be unwise to reduce this complex doctrine of knowledge to a single formula. But one would not be very far from the mark in saying that Bonaventure explains all true knowledge of the intelligible by the action and presence in us of a weakened ray of the divine light. A weakened ray, we say, because Bonaventure always declares that we do not attain the eternal "reasons" or ideas as they are in God, but as their reflection, and confusedly: we see of them only what a creature can, *communi propria ratione creata*. But it is certain, on the other hand, that the divine Ideas, or eternal reasons, are indeed the immediate rule of our knowledge. It is not simply *by* the eternal reasons, but *in* the eternal reasons that we see the truth: Bonaventure is formal on this point, and his steady refusal to water down his doctrine rests upon his interpretation of Saint Augustine. His thought is so firm here and his conviction so unshakable that he accepts even the utmost consequences that could be derived from it. If all true knowledge implies that we attain the eternal reasons, and as we attain these reasons only confusedly, does it not follow that we have no perfectly well-grounded knowledge here below? This, answers Saint Bonaventure,

must be conceded. We have certain and clear knowledge here on earth because the created principles that God has impressed in our minds, and by which we know things, appear to us clearly and unveiled. But that clear and certain knowledge is not complete; its ultimate foundation is still lacking, for, if the principles of knowledge are clear, the eternal Ideas, whose action regulates our intellect by submitting it to these principles, escape our notice here below, and yet they give the principles their truth value. If, therefore, one were to say that in this life we have no "plenary" knowledge, there would not be much objection to that: *si diceretur quod nihil in hac vita scitur plenarie, non esset magnum inconveniens*.¹⁷

Why this double aspect of human knowledge? It is because man finds himself in an intermediary position, doubtless infinitely nearer to things than to God, but between God and things nevertheless. One can consider truth as it is in God, in our soul, or in matter, and if we consider it in our soul we shall see that it has relation to the truth in God as well as to the truth in matter. An intermediate between two extremes, the soul turns by its superior part toward God, and by its inferior part toward things. From what is beneath it, it receives a relative certitude, from what is above it it receives an absolute certitude.

C. The World

Since we have relied upon creatures to raise us up to God, we have attained him immediately as creator. The question is now to know whether the world is eternal or whether it began in time. Aristotle and Averroes are of the opinion that the universe is eternal because movement itself is.¹⁸ Saint Thomas was to consider that the proofs adduced in favor of the eternity of the world are not decisive, but that there are no decisive proofs in favor of creation in time either; and thus creation in time will only be retained as true on the strength of revelation. Bonaventure adheres more firmly than ever to tradition on this point, and refuses the least concession to Aristotle's thought. To him, it is contradictory to admit that the world may have existed from all eternity. If the universe continued to exist after an infinite time had already gone by, one would have to admit that the infinite could increase since new days are added to old, or that of two numbers equally infinite, like the number of the lunar revolutions and that of the solar revolutions, one is twelve times larger than the other; or that the world had no initial time-limit, and that consequently it could not arrive at its present time-limit since the duration to be run through would be infinite. Moreover, let us remember that an infinity of objects of individuals cannot exist simultaneously (since an infinite quantity cannot actually exist); now if the world were eternal, there would be an infinity of immortal souls, which is contradictory. We should therefore recognize, not only by faith but also by reason, that it is impossible to posit the created universe as co-eternal with God.¹⁹

With respect to the very structure of creation, let us observe first that in all created things essence is really distinct from existence.²⁰ In other words, since no creature is of itself sufficient reason for its existence, each one requires the efficacy of a creator; thus pantheism is set aside. But in addition all created beings are made up of matter and form, that is, of possibility and of act. In itself, matter is not necessarily either corporeal or spiritual, it becomes one or the other only according to the form it receives. God alone is pure act. In every finite being, its very finiteness must necessarily leave room for a further possibility of being, and this possibility is the very thing we call matter. Thus the angels and human souls, because both of them are substances, are composed of a spiritual matter and the form which determines it.²¹

If this be true, matter alone cannot constitute the principle of individuation. A thing is, only because it has matter, but it is what it is only because that matter is determined by a form. The union of matter and form is the true principle of individuation.²² But in combining this theory of individuation with the theory of universal matter, we obtain two new consequences. The first is that it will not be necessary to agree with Saint Thomas that an angel, because devoid of matter, can only be an individual species rather than a true individual. The second is that we should have no difficulty in explaining the survival of the soul after the destruction of the body. Souls are not incomplete substances whose union with a body would constitute man, a complete substance. The soul is already a form complete in itself, composed of its matter and its form, independently from the body which it will in turn perfect. The soul possesses itself of the already constituted body and gives it its final perfection, but it achieves its own perfection in separating from it.²³

Two other doctrines give to Saint Bonaventure's doctrine of nature its characteristic aspect. First the thesis of the plurality of forms. Every being assumes as many forms as it has different properties; in each thing, therefore, a multiplicity of forms is discovered which are graded in such a way as to constitute a unity. That is true of the simplest bodies and even of elements. A body always presupposes at least two different forms; one, which is general and common to all, is the form of light, in which all things share; the other, or others, which vary with different beings, are mixed forms or elements. Secondly, Bonaventure integrates with his doctrine, under the double pressure of reason and Saint Augustine, the Stoic notion of seminal reasons. Matter, which by itself would be completely passive, immediately receives a virtual determination by the substantial forms which remain latent in it until they later germinate and unfold. All the phenomena and all beings in the universe are thus accounted for by the development into forms of primitive seeds, or seminal reasons, whose primary cause is God.²⁴

It appears from this summary that Saint Bonaventure's doctrine was

not without reason designated by the name "Augustinism." Although he combined Ibn Gabirol with Saint Augustine, it was really from the philosophical elements present in Augustine's doctrine that the principles of Bonaventure's conception of God were borrowed, together with his conception of human knowledge and the nature of things. But, even after having redistributed between their numerous sources all the elements of that synthesis, the existence of a spirit of Saint Bonaventure and an attitude truly personal to him must still be recognized. One frequently imagines, in reading his *Opusculum* or even his *Commentary on the Sentences*, a Saint Francis of Assisi gone philosopher and lecturing at the University of Paris. The confident ease and deep emotion with which Brother Bonaventure discovers in things the very visage of God, closely resemble the sentiments of Francis, reading like an illuminated manuscript the beautiful book of nature. And no doubt, sentiments are not doctrines but it happens that they engender doctrines. To that permanent emotion of a heart that feels itself near to God we owe the refusal to follow up to its very final consequences the philosophy of Aristotle, and the persistent maintenance of an intimate contact between creatures and their creator.

D. The Bonaventurian School

Representatives of this doctrinal complex are to be found everywhere in the second part of the thirteenth century, at Paris, Oxford and in Italy. These university centers were communicating at that time, as one did not leave Christendom in going from one to the other. Augustinians belonged to all the religious Orders, but most of them were Franciscan Brothers, and it is the members of this group that we are to study. Some of their names are still for us only the symbols of important works, largely unedited and consequently not well known, whose meaning will perhaps appear some day to be quite different from what we suppose it to be.

Such a surprise, however, is hardly to be expected with regard to Eustachius of Arras (d. 1291). This disciple of Saint Bonaventure gives the appearance, at least in the texts already published, of a resolute partisan of the doctrine of divine illumination.²⁵ To explain our knowledge of bodies, he admits that their substantial form can attain the intellect through the senses. This invites us to imagine that, in spite of his Aristotelian terminology, the substantial forms of which Eustachius speaks differed only slightly from forms as Bonaventure conceived them.

Another disciple of Saint Bonaventure, Walter of Bruges (d. 1307), left a *Commentary on the Sentences* (Bks. I, II, IV) that is almost entirely unpublished, and important *Disputed Questions*, which give evidence of his fidelity to the principles of Saint Augustine. He himself declared that he trusted more to Augustine and Anselm than to the Philosopher, and this statement is in keeping with the few published texts we already have

at our disposal. The hylomorphic composition of spiritual substances (souls and angels), direct knowledge of the soul by itself, the doctrine of divine illumination, the immediate certitude of the existence of God, are so many Bonaventurian theses that Gauthier must have taught at Paris about 1267-1269, and which belong—all of them—to the Augustinian complex.²⁶

The work of Saint Bonaventure's famous Italian disciple, Matthew of Aquasparta,²⁷ is also largely unpublished, but it has been better studied than the works of Walter of Bruges. Matthew had a clear mind, and if not in his commentary on Peter Lombard which seems to be an immature work,²⁸ at least in his admirably constructed disputed questions, he often clarifies points which Bonaventure had left unsettled. Faithful as he is to his master, there are nevertheless many points on which Matthew goes his own way. For instance, he stresses the unity of the human composite more forcefully than Bonaventure had done.²⁹ On the whole, however, his doctrine is mainly a development of that of his great predecessor.

The end of human knowledge is not speculation, but love.³⁰ Matthew knows well the various doctrines of the intellect.³¹ He himself thinks, with Aristotle, that the soul is created as a tablet on which nothing is written, but he looks for a conciliation between Aristotle and Augustine (p. 285) and he seems to find it (naturally enough) in Avicenna (p. 286), who, like Augustine, admits a certain activity of the sensitive powers. The soul itself makes its sensations; it progressively purifies the species from sense to imagination, and when the species is in its supreme state of purity, it is, so to speak, ready for the intellect. Averroes calls it "the intention understood in potency." The agent intellect then transforms it into the possible intellect and makes it to be understood in act.³² And this, Matthew concludes, is what the Philosopher calls to abstract.

It cannot be doubted that Aristotle is here providing a new language for what nevertheless remains the doctrine of Augustine. The fact becomes evident in the texts where Matthew describes our cognition of purely intelligible objects (p. 49) when these are present to the soul and seen in the light of the divine illumination. On this point, his doctrine is an amplified restatement of that of Saint Bonaventure.³³ There is no better witness to its authentic meaning than Matthew of Aquasparta. So far as we can judge from the now-known texts, the rest of the doctrine moved within the same circle as that of his Franciscan colleagues, but it would not be wise, with the scanty information at our disposal, to be too assertive on this point.³⁴

The remarkable interest some Franciscan theologians took in the Arabian *Perspectivæ* (treatises on optics), notably in the one by Alhacen, is easily explained. The science of light, optics taught the laws of that invisible light which symbolized in their eyes the invisible light with which God illuminates every man who comes into this world. Nothing was more

natural than to combine the science of light with a metaphysics of light and with the theology of divine illumination. Already developed by Grosseteste and taken up again occasionally by Saint Bonaventure, this synthesis occupies the whole of the *De luce* by the Franciscan Bartholomew of Bologna, master of theology in Paris, regent of the theological school of Bologna after Matthew of Aquasparta, and whom history loses trace of after 1294.³⁵ Forty-one disputed Questions by him, recently published, are waiting for their historian. Among them, the questions bearing on the Primary Principle, creation and the soul are of direct interest to the history of philosophy.³⁶

The *De luce* of Bartholomew joins the speculations inspired by optics not only to theology, but to spirituality. This work is essentially religious. Its scriptural theme is borrowed from Saint John (8, 12): "I am the light of the world; he that followeth me, walketh not in darkness, but shall have the light of life." For Bartholomew of Bologna, as for Roger Bacon, the Bible was the epitome of all truth. Why should it surprise us that the truth of optics should be in a way implied in the sacred text and that, consequently, science should spontaneously blend with theology? Of all the metaphors by which God designated himself, none more openly invites speculation than the comparison with light which, visible in itself, helps the feeble light with which nature endowed our eyes. The authors of treatises on optics distinguish *lux*, that is to say, the nature of light considered in its source; the ray (*radius*) which is light radially engendered in the center by the luminous source; *lumen*, or light spherically diffused from the center by luminous rays; *splendor*, that is to say, the gleam of shining objects made bright by light. In giving himself the title *lux*, and not that of ray (diffused light or gleam), God advises us that he is the very illuminative Source of all the intellectual creatures of the world, and not one of those engendered lights, which owe their being to his illumination. However ingenious they may be, the justifications that the *De luce* proposes for this thesis belong less to philosophical speculation properly so-called than to that symbolical theology of which Saint Thomas said that it was not demonstrative. Because optics knows seven modes of participation of material light, Bartholomew finds their seven corresponding modes of spiritual illumination in angelic and human intellects. To the various material conditions required by optics in order that a body may receive light, he makes as many spiritual conditions correspond, so that our intellect may receive divine illumination, in this life and in the other. The Franciscan spirituality and the methods of symbolical exegesis of Saint Bonaventure are predominant in this work, in which science and philosophy combine in a theology itself entirely turned toward spirituality. To Bartholomew of Bologna has sometimes been attributed the *Summa philosophica* ascribed to Pseudo-Grosseteste, of which we have already spoken. The only reason for doing so is that the unknown author of this

Summa refers to a treatise *De luce* as to one of his own works; but nothing proves that it is identical with Bartholomew's *De luce*. At any rate, and without considering this a decisive argument, one can at least note that the style and general inspiration of the two works are profoundly different.

The stability of the thirteenth-century Franciscan school is confirmed by the doctrine of Roger Marston, who taught successively at Oxford and Cambridge, then was minister of the Franciscan province of England from 1292 to 1298 and always remained a resolute supporter of the Augustinian doctrine of illumination. It should not be forgotten that, by subscribing to this doctrine, a theologian was committing himself to accept the philosophical notions of man, of the soul and of human knowledge that went with it.

Like Bacon, Marston distinguishes between the positions of the "philosophers" (Aristotle, Avicenna, Alfarabi, Averroes, etc.), the positions of the Saints (that is, essentially, Augustine), and the positions of the *philosophantes in theologia* whom he calls neither philosophers nor theologians but "those who philosophize in theology." Usually, on critical points, his personal position consists in showing that, although he himself feels perfectly satisfied with following Augustine, he sees no harm in using expressions borrowed from the "philosophers," provided they be given an authentically Augustinian meaning.

Conformably with this attitude, Marston restates the doctrine of Augustine on sensation conceived as an act of the soul, that is a "judgment" on sense impressions. Then he ascribes to the soul a twofold intellectual power, the possible intellect and the agent intellect. Then again he maintains that abstraction by the human agent intellect requires the light of a higher illuminating cause, which the philosophers consider a separate Intellect common to all men, but which the theologians call God. There is no harm in saying that God is the separate substance posited by the philosophers, provided it be well understood that its true name is God. For Marston, as for Matthew of Aquasparta and Saint Bonaventure, the difficulty was to know whether this illuminating influence of God was a natural light or a supernatural one, that is, a grace. Between nature and grace, no mean term is conceivable; yet Bonaventure himself had hesitated, and Matthew of Aquasparta had called it, now a "special influence," now a "somewhat general influence," of God. Marston himself considers that, unless the divine light makes an intellect see supernatural objects, its influence is "common," "inseparable" from the intellect, constantly created as the soul itself is, and, consequently, not supernatural.³⁷

These internal difficulties deserve to be noted because, under their stress, the Augustinian complex was then beginning to disintegrate. At first sight, it looked inseparable from Christian truth; on second thought, it raised a very difficult problem, namely: was man really one as a com-

posite substance, and was his intellectual knowledge a truly "natural" one apart from grace? In other words, was there such a thing as a strictly "natural light of the human intellect"? Pending the time when the clear awareness of these difficulties will give rise to the second Franciscan School, we are now meeting witnesses to the somewhat puzzled feeling experienced by the last representatives of the first one. There is no better example of this feeling than Peter Olieu (*Petrus Johannis Oliei*) who was born about 1248-1249 and died in 1298.³⁸

Most of the themes constitutive of the Augustinian complex of the thirteenth century reappear in his doctrine, but some of them are maintained by Olieu in a half-hearted way, and, as he himself says, because they are part and parcel of the doctrine of his Order, that is, of the teaching commonly received among Franciscan theologians. Olieu maintains, together with the classical doctrine of the composition of matter and form in the human soul, that of the plurality of forms in composite beings. Combining these two positions, he added to them the conclusion that, although the various substantial forms of man all make up a single soul and a single form of their spiritual matter, the intellective soul of man is joined to its body only through inferior forms. In other words, although it constitutes substantially one being by its union with the body, the intellectual soul is not its immediate form. This had always been a possible consequence of the doctrine of the plurality of forms, but so long as it had not been explicitly deduced, the theologians had raised no objections. On the contrary, the plurality of forms became suspect when some masters began to draw from it consequences that seemed to put the unity of man in jeopardy. In 1311, that is, after the death of Olieu, the Council of Vienne condemned the proposition that the intellectual or rational soul "is not of itself and essentially the form of the human body." This decision, which Descartes was still to remember in the seventeenth century, seems to have contributed to the downfall of the doctrine of the plurality of the forms in the composite.³⁹

Concerning human knowledge, Olieu follows the Augustinian doctrine of the active nature of sensation (because the corporeal cannot act upon the spiritual); he also follows the doctrine of divine illumination, which makes the certitude of natural knowledge rest upon the regulating influence of the divine light in us, but, on this point, he declares himself frankly puzzled. Peter knows full well the main objections directed against this doctrine. He therefore accepts it to the extent that it does not entail a sort of theological skepticism, that is, a mistrusting of the certainty of natural knowledge redeemed by the theological conviction that natural cognitions receive their necessity from a special influence of God. Although he himself does not see very clearly how this objection can successfully be met, he declares himself in favor of the doctrine of divine illumination because it is the traditional teaching of his Order.⁴⁰

The doctrine of the solidarity of the powers of the soul (*colligantia*), which was no less common before him than the preceding one, is clearly explained by Olieu. He relates it to the hylomorphic composition of the soul. As has been said, the soul is a composite unit made up of several forms arranged in hierarchic order (vegetative, sensitive, intellectual) and bound together by their common relation to the same spiritual matter. Since their matter is the same, the action of one of these forms agitates, so to speak, this matter, whose commotion is felt by the other forms and perceived by their knowing powers. There is therefore no direct action of one faculty on the others, but there is a natural solidarity between the several forms of a common matter.⁴¹

Similar positions are found in the unpublished commentary on the *Sentences* written by Peter of Trabes (*Petrus de Trabibus*), another Franciscan recently rescued from the complete oblivion in which he spent several centuries. After accepting for some time the position which made God the "formal" cause of natural knowledge, Peter gave it up as unintelligible to him. He could find no way to hold this position without accepting, as its necessary consequence, that all men naturally see the very essence of God. Since the light of God is his very essence, man could not see the one without seeing the other. At the same time, Peter maintains that the reason why the intellectual soul is free from the body and able to operate without it, is that, although it is the ultimate perfection of man, it is not through it that the soul informs the body (*non tamen secundum eam informat anima corpus, tribuens ei et communicans actum eius*). By accepting the new development added by Olieu to the traditional doctrine of the plurality of forms, Peter was exposing himself to the future condemnation of Vienne. This accounts for the fact that the doctrine of the unity of the substantial form taught by Thomas Aquinas, still considered a suspicious novelty in 1277, was going to gain ground progressively in the minds of many theologians.

Like Olieu, Peter complains that useless philosophical subtleties have been introduced into theology. For instance, is there only one possible intellect and only one possible agent intellect? First of all, is there any distinction between these so-called intellects? These terms are borrowed from the philosophers. Since Augustine got along very well without them in describing human knowledge, theologians could do without them in their turn. In fact, the human intellect is neither completely passive nor completely active; it is both at a time, so much so that, if it is to be called "possible," it should be conceived to be such with respect to the illuminating influence of God. Obviously, to Peter as to all the representatives of the same school, abstraction was more a psychological problem than a metaphysical one. As has been rightly noted by several of its historians, the continuity of the Franciscan tradition is remarkable on this point.⁴²

E. *Disintegration and Revival*

Cardinal Vital du Four (*Vitalis de Furno*) remained forgotten up to very recent years,⁴³ although several of his Disputed Questions, wrongly included in the pseudo-Scotist treatise *De rerum principio*, created many difficulties for the historians of John Duns Scotus. The recent publication of these questions has cleared up the situation concerning Duns Scotus but it has created another problem concerning Vital himself. In reading these texts, in which Vital du Four freely draws from his own contemporaries or immediate predecessors (Matthew of Aquasparta, John Peckham, Roger Marston, Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome), one should not forget that their author is not responsible for their publication. Besides our compiler often gives the slip to those whom he seems at first to follow. In his writings, as in the *Summa* of Albert the Great, personal conclusions often follow from borrowed arguments.

The essence of real beings is identical with their existence. Actual existence is the very essence of the thing as related to its efficient cause. It is not this relation; rather it is the essence of the thing as subjected to the relation. As to the relation itself, it is an actual participation in the divine resemblance; this participation is one with the essence of the existing thing; it is not something distinct from the essence nor added in any way to it. Obviously, Vital intends to turn down the "act of being" conceived as distinct from the essence by Thomas Aquinas. Since essence cannot exist without being individual, there is no reason to look further than existence in order to discover the principle of individuation. All essence is real from the very fact it exists, and it is singular from the very fact it is real. This doctrine of individuation by actual existence will be rejected by Duns Scotus.

All intellectual cognition bears first on the existing singular given sense perception. Sensation is the apprehension of the existence of an external being, which is the lowest object of cognition it is possible to conceive. Yet, even at this early stage of the acquisition of knowledge the intellect is already at work. In the sensation, it experiences the singular. What we call sensation is one with intellection because singular objects are simultaneously experienced by the senses and known by the intellect. Since this common act of cognition is numerically one, it is called sensation rather than intellection. The main concern of Vital on this point is not to prove that our intellect has a direct cognition of the singular; rather it is to explain why this cognition, which is the joint act of two powers of the soul, is denominated from the sensation rather than from the intellection which it includes. The fact remains, however, that our intellectual knowledge rests upon this first existential contact, which Vital calls "experiencing of the actuality of the thing, that is, a certain contact with the very actuality of the sensible thing."⁴⁴

Since the intellectual soul is tied to no corporeal organ, it can perceive both itself and its own acts by means of an internal sense. Vital is here maintaining the doctrine of Augustine on the intuitive knowledge that the soul has of itself and of its operations. If this inner sense did not exist, all science of the soul would be as impossible to us as the cognition of light is impossible to the blind. Moreover, this same internal sense makes it possible for us to receive the divine light. At the time of Vital, the problem of the nature of the divine illumination had reached a point of maturity which made it impossible for its supporters to content themselves with metaphors. Combining themes borrowed from Roger Marston and from Henry of Ghent, Vital states that the divine illumination cannot be described as an impression produced by God in the human intellect; if it were such an impression, it would participate in the mutability of the intellect that receives it; consequently, it would not confer on it the eternal immutability and necessity of truth. In order to avoid this consequence, Vital conceives the divine illumination as an intimate union of the soul with the light of God. This light insinuates itself in the mind more intimately than any species or any acquired knowledge; by its presence, it conforms our mind to truth known in its purity. God does this if and when he pleases, so that his intimate presence to the soul does for it all that which the sensible species and the sensible light can do for corporeal sight.⁴⁵ Mystical experience seems here to gain the upper hand.

Anxious as they are to maintain the doctrinal traditions of their Order, these later Franciscans modify them, if only by simplifying the problems. But the Augustinian complex seems to come to pieces even more clearly in the work of Richardus de Mediavilla,⁴⁶ who is commonly considered an Englishman, and, consequently, is called Richard of Middleton. Since he completed the Fourth Book of his *Commentary on the Sentences* soon after 1294, his work still belongs in the thirteenth century. He seems to have been a very free mind, with no rank prejudice, ready to welcome truth from wherever it came to him and to set out in new directions when need arose. Recent research shows us this Franciscan as almost won over to some of the fundamental positions of Thomist noetics: an agent intellect proper to every rational soul, which forms concepts by way of abstraction starting from sensible experience; no direct intuiting of the soul by itself; reduction of the divine illumination to the natural light of the agent intellect; no innate idea of God; a posteriori demonstrations of the existence of God, beginning with sensible experience: these are so many theses one would be more likely to meet in the writings of a Dominican influenced by Thomas Aquinas.⁴⁷ Let us note, however, that even there Richard "drinks from his own well," since he derives from these principles reasons to attribute the knowledge of the singular to the human intellect. We know these singulars, not only spiritual but even sensible, by one and the same intelligible species, in which our intellect first attains the universal, and

then, by reflection, the individual. There can therefore be, in a certain sense, an intellectual knowledge of the singular.⁴⁸

In metaphysics, Richard seems on the contrary to be held by theology within the limits of a more Bonaventurian notion of being. First, the pre-eminence of good over even being and truth: (*melior est ratio bonitatis quam ratio entitatis vel veritatis*), a principle inevitably entailing a certain pre-eminence of nobility ascribed to the will, not only in psychology, but also in ethics; then, rejection of the Thomist distinction of essence and existence, where Richard sees only a distinction of reason,⁴⁹ maintenance of the distinction of matter and form in every creature, spiritual or corporeal,⁵⁰ attributing a minimum of actuality to matter, since God can create a matter without any form. Over and above this matter, however, Richard grants another one, which is pure possibility, but not nothingness, and which can exist only concreated with form. Richard conceives it as transmissible from one form to the other by the action of natural agents. This way of conceiving form as bound to the pure possibility of matter dispenses him from admitting seminal reasons, but he maintains the plurality of forms, perhaps in substances that are inferior to man, certainly in the human compound, and he finds in the indivisibility of essence itself sufficient reason for its individuation. This dual meaning of the term matter can be traced back, with some probability, to the notion of matter developed by Gabirol.⁵¹

Nothing, in so eclectic a doctrine, betokens an innovator in physics. The history of sciences, however, assures us that he was one. Breaking with the traditional notion of a finite universe, Richard of Middleton upholds the possibility of a universe, not actually infinite or actually infinitely divided, but capable of expanding or dividing beyond any actually given limit: "God can produce a magnitude or a dimension which increases without end, provided that at every instant the magnitude already actually achieved be in that instant finite: just as God can indefinitely divide a continuum into parts whose size ultimately falls below any limit, provided there never exists actually an infinite number of really divided parts." This was an unexpected consequence of the condemnation of Arabian peripateticism in 1277, and we shall find other examples of it in the domain of science as well as in theology. Because it was a protest against Greek necessitarianism, that condemnation emboldened a number of theologians to affirm as possible, on account of the omnipotence of the Christian God, scientific or philosophical positions traditionally deemed impossible on account of the nature of things. In inviting new mental experiments, the theological notion of an infinitely powerful God freed minds from the finite limits within which Greek thought had enclosed the universe. Among the new hypotheses formulated on the strength of this principle, some were to be confirmed later on by Western science, for sometimes differ-

reasons and always by another method. Christian theology therefore facilitated, even in science, the opening of new perspectives.

Encouraged by Etienne Tempier's condemnation of the proposition "that the Prime Cause could not create several worlds," Richard maintains that the plurality of worlds is possible. Under the same influence, he maintains that God could impart to the farthest heaven, traditionally conceived as fixed, a movement of translation, and that there is no point in objecting that this movement would produce a void, whose existence was then judged to be impossible. The void, Richard in turn objects, would do away with the local distance between two bodies by suppressing the medium separating them, but these bodies would remain no less separate. After showing that these ideas were to reappear in Parisian scholasticism of the fourteenth century, P. Duhem concludes: "If we had to assign a date to the birth of modern science, we should undoubtedly choose that date of 1277 on which the bishop of Paris solemnly proclaimed that several worlds could exist and that the whole system of celestial spheres could, without contradiction, be endowed with a rectilinear movement." Nevertheless, in order not to form a distorted view of historical reality, let us also remember that the bishop of Paris never concerned himself with science; he simply declared that no philosopher, arguing from the intrinsic necessity of the world of Greek philosophy, had any right to impose limits on the free will and infinite power of the Christian God. From the very moment it became clear that God could have created another universe than that of Greek philosophy, theologians began to wonder if, in fact, he had not created another one. This was not a scientific liberation of science; it was theological liberation.

Whatever its origin may have been, Richard certainly was one of the first to take advantage of the newly acquired liberty, not only, as we have just seen, in cosmology, but also in kinetics. P. Duhem gives him the honor of having established, against Themistius and Aristotle, that the speed of a falling body does not depend solely on the distance from the center of the world, but also on the time elapsed and the space traversed. Other observations of Richard's, such as the introduction of an intervening rest between the rising of a projectile flying through the air and the moment of its fall, seem to have been frequently taken up again after him. These were new intellectual interests, of which Richard is one of the earliest witnesses and one of the most intelligent representatives.⁵² As to his philosophy, his best historian values it exactly when he says that "Richard finishes an epoch. The last representative of the school of Saint Bonaventure, he attempted a synthesis prudently new, in which were to be integrated the great Bonaventurian theses driven home and perfected, and what seemed to him to be the best in Saint Thomas' Aristotelianism and theology. This attempt was short-lived."⁵³

Other Franciscans, however, were entering similar ways at the same time, at least in philosophy, and paving the way for the new synthesis of Duns Scotus. Unless the Bonaventurian tradition had died off, no new Franciscan theology would have been possible. The work of the English master, William of Ware,⁵⁴ is still too little known for us to judge it but he seems to have played a part in this necessary preparation. His proofs of the existence of God derive their inspiration from both Aristotle and Augustine.⁵⁵ Like Richard, he abandons the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination. Like Thomas Aquinas, he thinks that the soul must have been provided by God with the faculties necessary for the exercise of its natural function, which is intellectual knowledge. Traditional Augustinism could not give way on this central position without abandoning others which rested upon it. Accordingly, William of Ware abandons the hylomorphic composition of spiritual substances and rallies to the doctrine of the unity of form. On the contrary, he maintains the identity of the faculties of the soul with its essence, for theological reasons which become apparent where he says that "the powers of the soul are its very essence and are distinct from one another like the divine attributes." This identification leads him to stress the interaction between faculties so fundamentally one. Thus William says, agreeing in this with Augustine, that the impression of the species in the memory or the intellect would not suffice without the actual assistance of the will which unites them. It is no wonder then that he should have placed, in his general classification of the activities of the soul, what he calls the "speculative will" above the speculative intellect, and the practical will above the practical intellect.⁵⁶ This tendency to voluntarism is not enough to justify the tradition, which does not go back much further than the end of the fourteenth century, according to which William of Ware was Duns Scotus' master. One thing, however, is sure. With William of Ware, it is clear that the Bonaventurian positions are being questioned. Duns Scotus could appear without creating a scandal within the Franciscan Order. One might even say that, in a sense, his coming was being expected.

This does not mean that there were never more to be any hearts attuned to the mystical appeal of Bonaventurian exemplarism. An exact contemporary of Duns Scotus, Ramon Lull (1235-1315),⁵⁷ took up again the same theme and gave it a new vitality. His life would make an excellent subject for a novel, but he himself has reviewed it for us, with as much simplicity as exactitude, in his *Disputatio clerici et Raymundi phantastici*: "I was a married man, the father of a family, well-situated as to fortune, lustful and worldly. I renounced all that of my own accord, in order to be able to honor God, serve the public good and exalt our holy faith. I learned Arabic, and went several times to preach to the Saracens. Arrested, imprisoned and flogged for the faith, I worked for five years to rouse the chiefs of the Church and the Christian princes on behalf of the common

weal. Now I am old, now I am poor, but my purpose is the same, and I shall persevere in it, God willing, even unto death." His life remained, therefore, entirely dominated by the same apostolic preoccupations which had inspired the work of Roger Bacon. The legend of Ramon Lull as an alchemist and to a slight extent a magician is in no way confirmed by the study of his life and works. It is true that, as at least two hundred works are attributed to him, very few persons can boast of having read them all; but many of them are very much alike, and since Lull often speaks of himself, one soon succeeds in picturing him as a great imaginative person (*phantasticus*) and even an illuminée (*Doctor illuminatus*), convinced that he holds his doctrine from a divine revelation, and who dedicates himself, with a slightly chimerical ardor, to the propagation of a homemade method of apologetics which will infallibly bring about the conversion of unbelievers.

Lull's famous *Art* is the exposition of that method. It consists essentially in circles on which are inscribed the fundamental concepts, in such a way that by combining the various possible positions of these circles with regard to one another, one can automatically obtain all the relations of concepts corresponding to the essential verities of religion. It must be confessed that when we today try to use those tables, we come up against the worst difficulties, and one cannot help wondering whether Lull himself was ever able to use them. If we confine ourselves to his own declaration, we must believe he was, the more so as we could not otherwise conceive the insistence with which he advocated the use of his *Art* against the errors of the Averroists and the Moslems.

The feeling of the necessity for an apologetic work intended to win over the infidels, so strong in Ramon Lull, was in no way personal to him and did not constitute a new fact. Ramon Martin in his *Pugio fidei*, and Saint Thomas with his *Summa contra gentiles*, had already pursued the same end. In the twelfth century, Alan of Lille's *Ars catholicae fidei* had already been a technique of apologetic demonstration, and closer to Lull, Roger Bacon's *Opus majus* also was the fruit of apostolic zeal for the propagation of faith through the power of Christian wisdom. But it can be said that, in Ramon Lull, that preoccupation was the very seed of the whole doctrine, especially his Arts. A method was necessary, but only one, to convict Moslems and Averroists of error. The Moslems deny Christian revelation while, on philosophical grounds, the Averroists refuse to take it into consideration. Philosophy and religion are therefore separated by an abyss, the one arguing only in the name of reason, the other arguing by a positive method (*positiva consideratio*), that is to say, in the name of revealed data which it posits first as fact, and from which it then deduces conclusions. Now it is evident *a priori* that it must be possible to establish agreement between the two sciences.⁵⁸ Theology is the mother and the mistress of philosophy; there must therefore be the

same accord between theology and philosophy that one always finds between cause and effect. The best way to reveal their fundamental agreement is to start with principles which are recognized and avowed by all. This is the reason why Ramon proposes the list of notions which figure on his tables, as principles common to all disciplines, self-evident, and without which there could be neither science nor philosophy.⁵⁹ These principles are: goodness, greatness, eternity or duration, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory; difference, agreement, contrariety, principle, means, end, greater, equality, smaller. All beings are either implied in these principles, or develop according to their essence and their nature. Ramon Lull adds to his list—and therein lies the secret of the *Great Art*—the rules which allow the correct combining of these principles; he even invented revolving figures which made it possible to combine them more easily, and all the combinations that Lull's tables make possible precisely correspond to all the truths and all the secrets of nature that the human intellect can attain in this life.

The rules which control all the possible combinations of those principles are a series of general questions applicable to all that is, for instance, what, why, how, which, when, where, and others of the same kind. As to the operations which enable us to relate particular things to universal principles by means of rules, they assume logical and metaphysical notions which Lull seems to put on the same level as the rest and to consider as equally evident. In a dialogue in which we see Lull convince an exceptionally docile Socrates, the Greek philosopher accepts as naturally evident propositions from which immediately results a demonstration of the Trinity. For instance, Lull considers as one of the rules of his art that human intelligence can rise above the verifications of the senses and even correct them; he also asks Socrates to admit that reason can criticize itself, with God's help, and sometimes recognize in itself the reality of a divine influence, whose effects it feels even though it cannot understand it. Socrates willingly admits that the intellect transcends the senses and must sometimes even transcend itself in recognizing the necessary existence of things which it does not understand.⁶⁰ Lull's art largely consists in begging ahead of time the principles from which the expected agreement must necessarily follow. But the technical processes thanks to which he believed he could teach the uninstructed and convince the unbelievers contained the germ of an idea which had quite a future. Those revolving tables on which Lull inscribed his fundamental concepts are the first attempt of that "combinative Art" that Leibniz, who remembered the mediaeval predecessor, also failed to constitute. It is by no means certain that the project of Ramon Lull is dead.

The influence of the *Doctor Illuminatus* was felt along other lines, at least one of which deserves to hold our attention. It is an old Christian idea that God revealed himself in two books, the Bible and the Book of

the World.⁶¹ Scotus Erigena's "theophanic" universe, the *liber creaturarum* of William of Auvergne and Saint Bonaventure, in fact the whole symbolism of the Lapidaries and the Bestiaries, without forgetting the symbolism that decorated the porches of mediaeval cathedrals or shone in their windows, were so many testimonials of a general confidence in the translucency of a universe in which the least of all beings was a living token of the presence of God. If, as is commonly believed, he was associated with the Franciscan Order, Lull had not far to look to make acquaintance with this universe. Saint Francis of Assisi and Saint Bonaventure had lived in no other one. Let us recall Saint Bonaventure's words: "the created world is like unto a sort of book in which the Trinity which made it is read," and let us compare them with those in which, speaking of himself, Lull describes that illumination he had one day in the solitude of Mount Randa: "It seems as though a light had been given him with which to discern the divine perfections, as to some of their properties and their mutual relationships, with all the connections there are between them . . . By that same light, he knew that the whole created being is nothing but an imitation of God" (*eodem lumine, cognovit totum esse creature nihil aliud esse quam imitationem Dei*). Obviously the illuminations of the "Illuminated Doctor" and of the "Seraphic Doctor" coincide. It can also be seen how the vision of Ramon Lull became the very foundation of his doctrine: the Great Art is possible only if, all creatures being so many images of God, or at least his more or less remote imitations, their fundamental properties, and the mutual relations of these properties, enable us to know the nature and attributes of God. Inversely, if the Great Art is possible, the method which permits us to combine the perfections of creatures in all possible ways should yield at the same time all possible combinations of the perfections of God. Let us grant, however, that when it is used to this end, the science of things becomes theology, but this is what Lull had wanted it to be from the very beginning.

CHAPTER II

SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGIANS IN ENGLAND

THE doctrinal continuity of the Franciscan School initiated by Alexander of Hales and promoted by Saint Bonaventure should not be construed as meaning that each religious order had its own theology. First, the Franciscan Order has never dedicated itself to the promotion of only one theology; Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, even Ockham, have always found Franciscan supporters. Secondly, up to the rise of Thomism, a large number of common theological positions were upheld by both Dominicans

same accord between theology and philosophy that one always finds between cause and effect. The best way to reveal their fundamental agreement is to start with principles which are recognized and avowed by all. This is the reason why Ramon proposes the list of notions which figure on his tables, as principles common to all disciplines, self-evident, and without which there could be neither science nor philosophy.⁵⁹ These principles are: goodness, greatness, eternity or duration, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory; difference, agreement, contrariety, principle, means, end, greater, equality, smaller. All beings are either implied in these principles, or develop according to their essence and their nature. Ramon Lull adds to his list—and therein lies the secret of the *Great Art*—the rules which allow the correct combining of these principles; he even invented revolving figures which made it possible to combine them more easily, and all the combinations that Lull's tables make possible precisely correspond to all the truths and all the secrets of nature that the human intellect can attain in this life.

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and Franciscans, with, of course, particular variations in content as well as in spirit.

The Dominicans (Black Friars) arrived at Oxford in the summer of 1221. The first of them to hold an Oxford degree in theology was Richard Fishacre. He is also the first English Dominican master to have written a commentary on the *Sentences*, probably about 1240-1243.⁶² It has been said of him, not without humor, that "it would certainly be an exaggeration to claim Fishacre as an ardent Aristotelian." In fact, the terms "Aristotelian" and "Augustinian" are so vague that they seldom can be used without some qualifications. In the particular case of Fishacre, however, the question arises whether Aristotle himself would have been able to understand the meaning of his main positions.

Fishacre admits the hylomorphic composition of angels and souls. Naturally he can prove it by Aristotelian arguments: there are individuals in the species angel and the species man; now Aristotle teaches that where there is no matter there are no individuals; therefore there is matter in angels and souls. Moreover, Aristotle affirms that an object exists without matter only in the thought of the maker; therefore a soul without matter could only exist in the thought of God. Concerning causality, Fishacre holds that the form of the effect must somehow pre-exist in matter (*aliquid formae latians in materia*); this adumbration of effect is what Saint Augustine called a "seminal reason," and the cause had only to actualize it to produce its effect. For Fishacre as for Saint Bonaventure, a cause producing an effect that was in no way pre-existent in matter would be not only efficient, but creative: it would produce *ex nihilo*. The fact may occur, but it is a miracle. These "seminal reasons" were created by God in matter, each of them corresponding to a "causal notion" in God's thought. One feels a bit discouraged to see Fishacre attribute this doctrine to Aristotle: (*patet quod Augustinus est huius ejusdem opinionis cum Aristotele*). His noetic took its inspiration from Augustine's, and perhaps from William of Auvergne. All cognition results not from an action of the object on the soul, but from the soul's aptitude for making itself similar to the object by "imitating it." As Saint Augustine and the Platonists say, this is possible because all truths are inscribed in the soul, where they are only dormant, so that they need only be awakened. Fishacre considers furthermore that here again Aristotle does not say anything different, but his Aristotelian exegesis is a desperate adventure.⁶³ Once such principles were admitted, nothing was easier for him than to develop under the form of proofs the latent knowledge of God that we possess. Not only does Saint Anselm's argument by the *quod majus cogitari non potest* satisfy him completely, but he proposes one of his own vintage, which seems still more direct: "If a thing were absolutely simple, it would not differ from its existence, but would be its existence; for, if it were not that, it would have existence and something

else in addition, and then it would not be absolutely simple. Consequently, if a thing were absolutely simple, it would exist; now the absolutely simple is absolutely simple: therefore it exists (*sed simplicissimum: ergo est*)."⁶⁴

The Franciscans (Grey Friars) arrived at Oxford in 1224. Their first masters at the university were Adam of Marsh, then Thomas of York, of whom mention has already been made. The successor of Thomas of York was Richard Rufus (Richard of Cornwall). He first read the *Sentences* at Oxford from 1250 to 1253; then at Paris, where he succeeded Saint Bonaventure, from 1253 to 1255; in 1256, he returned to Oxford.⁶⁵ Many studies have been devoted to the literary history of his works, but so little has been published that his doctrine remains practically unknown.⁶⁶ His historians have stressed the personal quality of his style and the sharpness of his tongue. He often apostrophizes his opponent. If the published fragments of his works fairly represent his general attitude, Richard intended to adhere to the theological teaching of Peter Lombard and, in many cases, he declared his unwillingness to take sides in philosophical discussion. This is what he did with respect to the substantial unity of the soul.⁶⁷ On the problem of hylomorphism, he likewise refused to choose.⁶⁸ We do not know if this was his usual attitude; any opinion concerning the character of his works should be suspended until after their publication.

I. ROBERT KILWARDBY

The successor of Fishacre in the Dominican chair of theology at Oxford was Robert Kilwardby.⁶⁹ After taking his degree of master in arts at the University of Paris, he succeeded Fishacre from 1248 to 1261, was elected Archbishop of Canterbury in 1272, created cardinal in 1272, and died at Viterbo in 1279. Chronologically speaking, he belongs in the same generation as Saint Thomas Aquinas; intellectually, he lived in a different doctrinal world. The fact is the more interesting as, at that date, it becomes difficult to account for the existence of different theological schools by the unequal progress they had made in the discovery of Aristotle. Kilwardby is credited with commentaries on the logic of Aristotle and on the following works: *Physics*, *On the Heaven and the World*, *On Coming to be and Passing away*, *On the Soul* and on the *Metaphysics*. These works, as well as his *Commentary on the Sentences*, have not yet been sufficiently studied.⁷⁰

The very title of his treatise *On the Origin of Sciences* recalls the similar work of Gundissalinus. It is a classification of the sciences, inspired by Aristotle and developed as a general introduction to philosophy.⁷¹ His personal positions, however, appear more clearly in his commentary on Peter Lombard and in several short treatises recently studied, *On the*

Imaginative Spirit, On Time, On the Unity of Forms, On the Nature of Relation, On Conscience, On Theology, in which Kilwardby speaks for himself. His very instructive letter to Petrus de Confleto (Peter of Conflans) is of great value to locate his own positions with respect to the main doctrinal currents of his time.

On March 7, 1277, Etienne Tempier had condemned a long list of propositions, in the hope of checking the Averroist movement and the spread of theologies which, like Thomas Aquinas', took their inspiration from Aristotle's method. Some days later (March 18, 1277), in his capacity as Archbishop of Canterbury, Kilwardby, in turn, condemned a much shorter list of thirty propositions, manifestly chosen with the same intention and in the same spirit.⁷² Although it is ordinarily used in this connection, the term "condemnation" is not absolutely exact. The Dominican Archbishop of Corinth, Peter of Conflans, having reproached him for his action, Kilwardby answered that this condemnation "was not of the same kind as the condemnations of actual heresies, but that it was an interdiction to affirm such conclusions in the schools, either in concluding (disputed questions), or in lectures, or under any other dogmatic form." It should, however, be recognized that, in his own opinion, the Christian faith was at least indirectly at stake. He himself says, in fact, about the errors he was forbidding to be taught, that "some are manifestly false, some depart from philosophical truth, some border on intolerable errors, and some are obviously baneful as opposed to the Catholic faith." To which Kilwardby adds this historically instructive remark: "I have not acted alone in this prohibition: on the contrary, as you put it yourself, it met with the approval of all of the masters of Oxford; it was even the counsel (*suasio*) of many theologians and philosophers more competent than I which bound me to it."

Kilwardby probably exaggerates slightly. If one thinks of the early pro-Thomist reactions on the part of certain Dominicans of Oxford, such as Richard Clapwell, who followed that prohibition by very little, one cannot help thinking that, as early as 1277, Thomistic theology found at Oxford some sympathy. But that must have been, as they say, "among the young" who represented the present turned toward the future. The masters in full authority, who represented the present continuing the past, mistrusted these innovations. In 1277, the Archbishop of Oxford was slightly behind the teaching of Oxford and the Bishop of Paris was publicly denouncing as dangerous certain theses taught by the future Common Doctor of the Church, Saint Thomas Aquinas. It is human for the guardians of orthodoxy to confuse it sometimes with their personal way of conceiving it.

The sixteen propositions in natural philosophy prohibited by Kilwardby do, in fact, give us information on his own positions.⁷³ The third prohibits to teach at Oxford that "there is no active potency in

matter." This was tantamount to enforcing the teaching of a doctrine of causality analogous to Augustine's "seminal reasons." Besides, it is what Kilwardby says in his Letter to Peter of Conflans, and what he had already upheld in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, where he identified the active power of the secondary cause, which moves because it is moved, with what is called "seminal reason" because it lies in matter like a seed. Just as that interdiction to teach the Aristotelian doctrine of matter affected all ontology and all physics, the whole of psychology and anthropology was affected by the twelfth proposition: "that the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellective are one simple form." To be forbidden to teach this, was practically to be obliged to teach the plurality of forms in the soul and, consequently, in man. Once more, this is what Kilwardby's Letter to the bishop of Corinth expressly maintains: "I know, however, that for one man there is one form, and that this form is not one in this sense that it is simple, but it is made up of many forms mutually related according to a natural order." Kilwardby's *Commentary on the Sentences* had already taught the same doctrine: "The constitution of an individual requires several forms in a single matter, as, in this one fire, there is the form of the substance, the form of the body and the form of fire (*igneitas*). The seminal reasons and the plurality of forms, ordinarily suffice to locate a doctrine, but some recent soundings in his *Commentary* on Peter Lombard and in the other treatises confirm the diagnosis: hylomorphic composition of angels; divine illumination required as complement to our intellectual light, even for the knowledge of the sensible; simple distinction of reason between the soul and its faculties, all these positions belong to the Augustinian complex. Kilwardby gives evidence of personal initiative in his way of justifying these theses, especially on the points where patristic tradition was no longer enough to enlighten him. His solution of the problem of individuation would deserve to be studied closely for the philosophical and historical interest attached to it. He posits form as the active cause and matter as the passive cause of individuation, but the latter seems to him to be a complex fact which includes individuality itself. One should therefore say: first matter and form, then determination (*signatio*) of matter by form, and finally the resulting individual which is being in act. Form itself, he clearly states, individuates itself in making its matter individual, and actual existence seems to be the property of the individual thus constituted.⁷⁴

It has already been noted, with regard to Richard of Middleton, that the rejection of the Aristotelian doctrine of movement occurs well in advance of the Parisian nominalism of the fourteenth century. The question is not without importance. We have seen P. Duhem date from the condemnation of 1277 the beginnings of modern science,⁷⁵ in another text, the same historian proposes another date, and a later one: "If one

wished, by a definite line, to separate the reign of antique Science from the reign of modern Science, he would have to draw it, I think, at the instant that John Buridan conceived that theory (of the *impetus*), at the instant when they ceased to regard the stars as moved by divine beings, when they agreed that celestial movements and sublunary movements depended on one and the same mechanics."⁷⁶ Since this last point implies the existence of a mechanics, it is, for the history of science, the principal point; but it is not without interest to note that, at least in theology, the Aristotelian doctrine of motive Intelligences was an innovation. According to Aristotle, all movement presupposes a mover distinct from the mobile; that is why he attributes separate Movers to the celestial spheres, and Saint Thomas Aquinas follows him docilely on this point; but this novelty shocked the theologians of the old school. In 1271, the general minister of the Dominican Order, John of Vercelli, addressed to Thomas Aquinas and Robert Kilwardby a list of forty-three questions, to which both gave rather different answers. To John of Vercelli's fourth question: "Is it infallibly proven that the angels are the movers of celestial bodies?", Saint Thomas answered that, on the one hand, Christian Doctors taught that God governs inferior things by means of superior things, and that, on the other hand, the Platonist and peripatetic philosophers held to be conclusive their proofs that celestial bodies are either animated and moved by their souls (Avicenna), or, better still, are moved by angels (Averroes). This was not exactly claiming that the thesis was infallibly proven, but to say that the philosophers held it to be proven, that it was in agreement with a general principle posited by the Fathers, and to add that none of them, as far as one could remember, had ever denied it, was tantamount to recommending it. On the other hand, while he expressed himself with indulgence on the Avicennian thesis of the souls of spheres, Kilwardby rejected the idea that celestial bodies may be moved by angelic spirits which are neither their acts nor their forms. This opinion, he declares, "is not philosophical, nor do I remember that any Saint approved of it as true and certain." Thus, while Thomas Aquinas is content to have it considered as proven by the philosophers without being denied by the Fathers, Kilwardby declares it to be without any philosophical value and notes that no Father accepted it as certainly true. His answer went more closely into John of Vercelli's question, but that was because he himself preferred a third opinion to the two preceding ones—an opinion he, moreover, does not present as personal. *Tertii ponunt . . .* a third group acknowledges that, just as light and heavy bodies are moved by their own weight and inclinations (*propriis ponderibus et inclinationibus*) toward the places where they come to rest, in the same way celestial bodies move circularly in space because their natural inclinations, which are as their weight, are to preserve corruptible beings and to keep them from rapidly disintegrating and perishing. As it has been justly remarked, "the inclination, the

tendency of their own weight seem surely to belong to the order of quality, and therefore remain under the spell of Aristotle's qualitative physics, while the *impetus* of Buridan is clearly oriented toward a quantitative interpretation and is open to mathematical measurement."⁷⁷ In other words, Kilwardby is not yet on the threshold of modern science, because he is not concerned with mechanics, but he certainly affirms the principle that the celestial movements and the sublunary movements may depend on one and the same mechanics. Conservatives sometimes get ahead of progressives simply by anticipating progress without moving from the spot.

2. JOHN PECKHAM

Kilwardby's successor to the archiepiscopal seat of Canterbury was John Peckham (d. 1292). He was a Franciscan⁷⁸ but one who used his authority to renew, October 29, 1284, the doctrinal condemnation pronounced by his Dominican predecessor, and censured, April 30, 1286, certain propositions of Richard Clapwell. His personal attitude is clearly defined in a letter dated June 1, 1285, to the Bishop of Lincoln: "I do not in any way disapprove of philosophical studies, insofar as they serve theological mysteries, but I do disapprove of irrelevant innovations in language, introduced within the last twenty years into the depths of theology against philosophical truth, and to the detriment of the Fathers whose positions are disdained and openly held in contempt. Which doctrine is more solid and more sound, the doctrine of the sons of Saint Francis, that is, of Brother Alexander (of Hales) of sainted memory, of Brother Bonaventure and others like him, who rely on the Fathers and the philosophers in treatises secure against any reproach, or else that very recent and almost entirely contrary doctrine, which fills the entire world with wordy quarrels, weakening and destroying with all its strength what Augustine teaches concerning the eternal rules and the unchangeable light, the faculties of the soul, the seminal reasons included in matter and innumerable questions of the same kind, let the Ancients be the judges, since in them is wisdom, let the God of heaven be judge, and may he remedy it."⁷⁹

This priceless testimony traces the origin of the evil it denounces back to about 1265. As a matter of fact, the commentaries of Saint Thomas on Aristotle date from the years 1269-1270, and since the dates proposed for the *Summa contra gentiles* vary between 1258 and 1264, in 1285 it was really less than twenty years before (*citra viginti annos*) that the novel theology Peckham deplores had been definitely constituted. It will be noted also that Peckham does not disapprove of philosophy, but of a certain indiscreet use of a false philosophy; that, in spite of the opposite case of the Dominican Kilwardby which he had had under his very eyes, the opposition of the two doctrines was concretely translated by him into an

opposition of the two Orders: the Augustinism of the Franciscans and the Aristotelianism of the Dominicans; lastly, that when he wants to list some of the points upon which the two groups are opposed, the first three that come to his mind are, in the order in which he mentions them: the doctrine of divine illumination, the real unity of the powers of the soul with the essence of the soul, and seminal reasons.⁸⁰

To attribute considerable importance to the problem of knowledge in the doctrinal struggles of the closing thirteenth century is not yielding to an illusion of perspective due to the influence of modern philosophy. Even without Peckham's declaration, the long list of disputed questions devoted to it would give information enough. The truth is that this problem did not owe its importance to any idealistic preoccupations, but to its metaphysical and religious connotations. It is above all a question of knowing whether or not man can get along without a special help from God for a knowledge of the true. On the answer given to this question depends the value of the Augustinian proofs of the existence of God by truth, with the doctrine of the inner Master and the spirituality inspired by it. That is why we see Peckham himself closely examining this problem in his Questions *De anima*. Careful to lose nothing of the true teaching of the philosophers, but especially to sacrifice nothing essential in Augustine's teaching, he grants to each man a created agent intellect, but, in full agreement on this point with Bacon and Albert the Great, he adds to it a still higher agent intellect, which is God. His position is therefore not the position of Avicenna, for whom the sole agent intellect of the human species was not God, but a separate Intelligence; nor is it the position of Thomas Aquinas, for whom God is not in any sense our own "agent intellect"; but, if he had to choose between Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas, Peckham would prefer Avicenna; "Avicenna, who posited the agent intellect as a separate Intelligence, did better than those who posit it as but a part of the soul."⁸¹ In reality, the only one who stated the truth in this case, if not the whole truth at least its essential, is Saint Augustine, whom nothing seems to have been able to dislodge from Oxford until toward the last few years of the thirteenth century.

Faithful to the Fathers, Peckham was also faithful to scientific studies as can be seen from his *Perspectiva communis* (Optics), his *Tractatus sphaerae*, the *Theorica planetarum* and the *Mathematicae rudimenta*. In these, he was promoting the tradition of Roger Bacon and Robert Grosseteste.⁸² The time-honored alliance between Platonism and mathematics, the fidelity to the tradition and spirituality of the Fathers, are certainly more frequently met together in thirteenth-century England than on the Continent. One would like to follow the history of this patristic culture; one would particularly like to know if it was by chance that Oriel College gave us Joseph Butler in the eighteenth century and, in the nineteenth, Henry Newman.

With the exception of Robert Grosseteste, who heads the list of famous Oxonians, the great English masters of the thirteenth century belong to one of the two great Mendicant Orders. The study of the English secular masters is still much less advanced than that of their Parisian colleagues. Very little is known of Robert of Winchelsea (d. 1313), the author of theological questions; of Henry Wile (d. 1329), who left Questions *De anima*, or of Gilbert Segrave (d. 1316), of whom Leland remarked that his works were often met, in Oxford libraries and elsewhere, but none of which have been identified. The only one of these English secular masters who recently came out of obscurity is Simon Faversham (d. 1306), whose Questions on the *Categories* and on Book III *De anima* were recently published.⁸³ These are the clear and concise notes of a professor well-informed on the Greek and Arabian commentaries of the works he discusses, and whom his moderate opinions do not involve in any adventures. He carefully avoids Averroism, betrays no inclination toward Augustinism, and generally stresses, in his Questions *De anima*, solutions analogous to Saint Thomas Aquinas'. Ever since about 1270, but still more markedly by the end of the thirteenth century, it becomes impossible to interpret the philosophical or theological positions of the mediaeval masters without taking Thomism into consideration.

CHAPTER III

THOMAS AQUINAS

I. THE THOMISTIC REFORMATION

No two doctrines of the masters we have studied so far can be said to be identical, but they all had in common a certain number of fundamental positions, or, at least, they all shared in common a limited number of possible doctrinal positions among which they made their choice.

Among these positions, one at least has been maintained by all the masters we have studied, and this without a single exception, since it includes even Albert the Great. It is the definition of the soul as a spiritual substance. This was the unanimous opinion of all. Taken in itself, the soul is a substance. Naturally, since man is one, this substance implies, in its very essence, some sort of relation to its body. Some would call it a "unibility," others a love or an inclination; still others preferred to say that soul is, secondarily, the act and perfection of its body, but not one of them would uphold the view that the very essence of this substance was to be the form of a body. The origin of their position is well known. It is the definition of man given by Plato in the *Alcibiades*, and inherited from him, through Plotinus, by Saint Augustine: man is a soul that uses a body. To the extent that all the masters we have studied are indebted to

cennism" (R. de Vaux, *Notes et textes* . . ., Paris, 1934). The vague allusion to the "prime cause" which follows this statement does not imply its identification with the separate Intelligence of the lowest order that is here in question. The "commentary" attributed to Peter of Spain does not help on this point. On the contrary, it develops at great length the doctrine of the "universal Intellect moving all things" (the *intelligentia universalis* agents of Albert the Great), which is upheld, under various forms, by many masters of those times (371, 435-436), but the separate Intelligence of Peter does not appear in the commentary. The possible objection, that the place for it was in Book III, is not very impressive, for the author of these questions has found a way to describe the relations of the two intellects, possible and agent, long before the end of Bk. II. To repeat, we do not deny the authenticity of the commentary, we doubt it.

⁴⁵ Another still little known late thirteenth-century master is HENRY OF BRUSSELS. B. Haureau, *Henri de Bruxelles, religieux de l'abbaye d'Affligem*, in HLF, 27 (1887) 105-108; *Notices et extraits*, 35 (1906) 213-219. M. Grabmann, *Die Aris-*

totaleskommentare des Heinrich von Brüssel und der Einfluss Alberts des Grossen auf die mittelalterliche Aristotelesklärung, Sitzungsberichte, 1943, 10; Munich, 1944; life, 29-39 (began to teach shortly before 1289; perhaps rector in 1307); Commentaries on *Topics* (6-11), on *Metaphysics* (11-15); Quodlibetal questions in natural philosophy by Henry of Brussels. Henricus Alemanus, Johannes Vate, Wericus (17-24). Specimens of topics for disputed questions on *Physiologia*, "Utrum homines rufi sint fideles"; on *Problemata*, "Utrum ebrus bibens oleum fit sobrius"; on *De animalibus*, "Utrum tigris magis debeat stare supra unum pedem quam supra duos." A very remarkable question, especially since it belongs in *Historia animalium*, is "Utrum monachi debeant esse pinguiore quam alii." Between those who think that mediaeval masters only asked silly questions, and those who think they never asked silly questions, there is room for an intermediate opinion. Mediaeval masters sometimes asked foolish questions, but they asked quite a few important ones. At any rate, the preceding questions were simply intended to provide material for practical drill in dialectics.—Fragments of the commentaries, pp. 68-92.

PART EIGHT

THE GOLDEN AGE OF SCHOLASTICISM

CHAPTER I. THE FRANCISCAN SCHOOL

¹ ALEXANDER OF HALES. Alexandri de Hales OFM., *Summa theologia*, ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi), 4 vols., I, 1924; II, 1928; III, 1930; IV, 1948 (in two parts). On the problem of authenticity, V. Doucet, ed. cit., *Prolegomena ad Summam Halensiam*, IV.—Same author, *The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa*, Franciscan Studies, 7 (1947) 26-41, 274-312; *De "Summa Fratris Alexandri Halensis" historice considerata*, RFNS, 40 (1948) 1-44. F. Henricus, *Fr. Considerans, l'un des auteurs primitifs de la Summa Fratris Alexandri*, RTAM, 15 (1948) 76-96.—Authentic questions of Alexander have been discovered: F. M. Henricus, *Les questions inédites d'Alexandre de Hales sur les fins dernières*, RTAM, 10 (1938) 56-78, 153-172; *De 107 questionibus*

halensis cod. Tudertin. 121, Antonianum 13 (1938) 335-366, 480-514; *Le commentaire d'Alexandre de Hales sur les Sentences enfin retrouvé*, Miscellanea Mercati, Città del Vaticano, 1946, pp. 359-382 (Studi e Testi, 122). V. Doucet, *New Source of the "Summa Fratris Alexandri." The Commentary on the Sentences of Alexander of Hales*, Franciscan Studies, 6 (1946) 403-417.—Publication of the oldest among these authentic texts: *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, Quaracchi-Florence, 1951; *II Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, Quaracchi-Florence, 1952 (glosses on Sentences I and II).—Bibliography: I. Hauser, *A Bibliography of Alexander of Hales*, Franciscan Studies, 5 (1945) 431-454. Introduction to the doctrine of the *Summa*: Ph. Boehner OFM., *The System*

of *Metaphysics* of Alexander of Hales, Franciscan Studies, 5 (1945) 366-414. E. Bettoni, *Il problema della cognoscibilità di Dio nella scuola francescana* (Alessandro d'Hales, S. Bonaventura, Duns Scotus), Padova, 1950. Cf. J. Rohmer, *AHDL*, 3 (1928) 106-120. C. Bérubé, *La connaissance intellectuelle du singulier matériel au XIIIe siècle*, Franciscan Studies, 11 (1951) 157-201 (from Alexander of Hales to Henry of Ghent).—V. Doucet, *AFH*, 27 (1934) 534-538.

An important witness to the influence of Alexander of Hales is the Franciscan Odo RIGAUD (Eudes Rigaud, Odo Rigaudus, d. 1275). His treatise *On the Powers of the Soul* has long been attributed to Albert the Great (O. Lottin, *PEM*, I, 498-499).—F. M. Henricus, *Les manuscrits et l'influence des écrits théologiques d'Eudes Rigaud OFM*, RTAM, 11 (1939) 324-350; *Le commentaire d'Eudes Rigaud sur le IVe livre des Sentences*, CF, 10 (1940) 481-493. V. Doucet, *Alexandri de Hales Summa theologia*, IV, *Prolegomena*, 228-234. O. Lottin, *Une question disputée d'Odon Rigaud sur le libre arbitre*, RT, 36 (1931) 886-895; cf. 34 (1929) 234-248; *Un Commentaire sur les Sentences tribulaire d'Odon Rigaud*, RTAM, 7 (1935) 402-405; *PEM*, 1, particularly 149-181, 220-222, 447-450, 494-500; II, 196-202, 449-450, 473-479, 561-563; III, 85-89, 159-161, 215-225, 294-295, 388-397, 435-437, 594-597, 713-720. B. Pergamo OFM., *Il desiderio innato del soprannaturale nelle questioni inedite di Odone Rigaldo OFM*, *archivum di Rouen* (d. 1275), Studi Francescani, 33 (1936) 76-108. F. Pelster, *Beiträge zur Erforschung des schriftlichen Nachlasses Odo Rigalds*, Scholastik, 11 (1936) 518-542.—V. Doucet *AFH*, 27 (1934) 541-542. GLOTT, 2, 289.

² Imperfect but useful edition of John's *Summa* by Teofilo Domenichelli, *La "Summa de anima" di Frate Giovanni della Rochelle*, Prato, 1882. Manuscripts of the works attributed to John, including the *Summa de anima*, in Part. Minges, *De scriptis quibusdam Fr. Joannis de Rupella OFM*, (d. 1245), *AFH*, 6 (1913), 597-622; according to Minges, the text of Domenichelli is spurious from p. 299 line 26 up to the end (p. 605).—On the doctrine: H. Luguet, *Essai d'analyse et de critique sur le texte inédit du Traité de l'âme de Jean de la Rochelle*, Paris, 1875; *Johannis de Rupella ex libro hactenus*

inedito cui "Summa de anima" titulus inscribitur psychologiam doctrinam de-prompsit H. Luguet, Paris, 1875. G. Manser, *Johann von Rupella, Ein Beitrag zu seiner Charakteristik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Erkenntnislehre*, JPST, 26 (1912) 290-324; *Die Realdisinction von Wesenheit und Existenz bei Johannes von Rupella*, RT, 19 (1911) 89-92. Parth. Minges, *Zur Erkenntnislehre des Franziskaners Johannes de Rupella*, PJ, 27 (1914) 461-471; *Die psychologische Summe des Johann von Rupella und Alexander von Hales*, FS, 3 (1916) 365-378. J. Rohmer, *AHDL*, 3 (1928) 130-141. O. Lottin, *Alexandre de Hales et la Summa de viitis de Jean de la Rochelle*, RTAM, 1 (1929) 240-243; *Alexandre de Hales et la Summa de anima de Jean de la Rochelle*, RTAM, 2 (1930) 396-409. F. M. Henricus, *1st der Traktat De legibus et princeps in der Summa Alexander von Hales von Joh. von Rupella*, FS, 26 (1939) 1-22, 234-258. C. Fabro, *La distinzione tra "quod est" e "quod est" nella Summa de Anima di Giovanni de la Rochelle*, DTP, 41 (1938) 558-522. H. Pouillon, *La beauté de Salma, Jean de la Rochelle et les débuts de l'averroïsme latin*, *AHDL*, 16 (1947-1948) 133-144.—Literary history, V. Doucet, *Alexandri de Hales Summa theologia*, vol. IV, Quaracchi, 1948; *Prolegomena*, 211-228; and *AFH*, 27 (1934) 539-541.

³ All the references in notes 3 and 4 are to Bk. I of the *Summa*. The prologue begins with a prayer in the twelfth century Cistercian style, which soon leads to the already scholastic division of the subject matter: *primo quaerendum an sit anima, secundo, quid sit* (ed. Domenichelli, p. 102). The existence of the soul as a spiritual substance is proved by the argument of Avicenna: a man suddenly created without sensations, external or internal, would not know that he has a body; yet he would know himself as a spiritual being; hence his soul is incorporeal (ch. I, p. 104). Moreover, the soul is receptive of the divine illumination (quotes Augustine, *Soliloquies*); so, in itself, it is a substance, both incorporeal, intellectual, and able, after the intelligences, to perceive the divine illumination (III, p. 107). With respect to its body, it is form; the Aristotelian definition of the soul thus completes its Augustinian

and Avicennian definitions (V, pp. 110-111). John justifies seven different definitions. The soul is not composed of matter and form, but of *quod est* and incorporeal substance, (XXIII, pp. 134-135) and in comparison with all that is not God. On the other hand, it has multiplicity with respect to its operations; so the soul is one substance in three powers: the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational powers (XXIV, pp. 135-138). In this sense, it is an image of God (XXVII, pp. 143-145). John deals at great length with this Augustinian problem (XXXI-XXXIII, pp. 152-160).

* Unlike an angel, a soul has an essential aptness to be united to a body, whose form it is; yet, there are intermediaries between body and soul (XXXV, pp. 161-163). These are the powers of the soul, which are intermediate between its essence and its operations (XXXVI, pp. 163-165). Moreover, the body itself contains a still more noble nature than that which is to be found in corporeal animals, namely "light"; more precisely, the light of the empyrean heaven which, because it is as near being spiritual as a body can be, disposes the human body to receive the noblest life, namely, rational life (XXXVIII, p. 174). At any rate, since it is of the essence of the soul to be united to a body, to be in it is for the soul neither misery nor a punishment (XXXIX, pp. 175-176). Besides moral reasons, there are direct arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul; since it is immaterial, the soul cannot suffer a division of matter from form, and since it is simple, there can be in it no disintegration of parts; moreover, since its being does not depend on that of the body, the absence of the body cannot corrupt the being of the soul (XXXVIII, p. 172; XLII, pp. 179-184; XLIII, pp. 184-189). While they are being united, however, there is between soul and body a sort of solidarity (*colligatio*) which explains how the body, which is a corporeal substance, can act upon an incorporeal substance such as the soul: XLII, pp. 193-194.

* All the following notes refer to Bk. II of the *Summa*; only chapters and pages are indicated.—As has been said, the essence of the soul is not identical with

its powers (several positions discussed, I, pp. 217-220). The distinction of the powers of the soul is due to their own nature, but it is known from both their objects and their operations (II, pp. 220-223). John classifies the powers of the soul according to the doctrine of a treatise *De anima et spiritu*, which he ascribed to Saint Augustine, although it was the work of the Cistercian monk Alcher of Clairvaux (i.e., *De spiritu et anima*). For more precisions, he resorts to John Damascene. Because he then follows Alcher, John introduces the highest power of the soul, *intelligentia*, in ch. IV, p. 227, after which, following Damascene, he studies sensations (V, pp. 228-230), imagination (VI, 230-231), the cogitative, or *opinio* (VII, 231), memory (VIII, 231-232), the mind or *mens* (IX, pp. 232-235), passions (X, pp. 235-239), the will and free will (XI-XV, pp. 239-245). After exploiting this material borrowed from John Damascene, our author goes over practically the same problems a second time, following now the teaching of the "philosophers," especially of Avicenna (XVI-XXXIII, pp. 245-283). This, however, does not prevent him from blending, even there, Augustine and Damascene with philosophers properly so-called, as happens in ch. XXXV, pp. 284-288. The nature of abstraction is first described in a general way, as a stripping of form from their individuating accidents (pp. 286-288), but, at the moment of describing the nature of the intellect, John has to face the psychology of Avicenna, with its well-known classification of the intellects, from the *intellectus materialis* to the *intellectus accommodatus* and the *intellectus agens* (XXXVI, pp. 288-290). There, blending together the gospel of Saint John (I, 9), Augustine (*Soliloquies* I, 8, 15; PL., 32, 877) and Denys the Aeropagite, he observes that an angel could be posited as the agent intellect of our possible intellect; but he rejects this solution and identifies the agent intellect with the higher part of our own created intellect (XXXVII, p. 290-294). Our agent intellect is a nature substantially identical with the divine light of which the Psalmist says (Ps. 4, 7): "The light of thy countenance . . . etc." (XXXVIII, p. 295). Cf. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, I, 79, 4, Resp.

* *Summa de anima*, II, ch. 35, p. 286.—On psychological and moral problems

omitted from this book, O. Lottin, PEM., I, 401, 443, 474, 493; II, 86, 357; III, 35, 76, 177, 182, 293, 375.

* SAINT BONAVENTURE. OFM.—Born in 1221 at Bagnorea, near Viterbo (Italy), entered the Franciscan Order about 1238; studied under Alexander of Hales at the University of Paris, where he himself taught from 1248 to 1255. His commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard dates from these years (1250-1255). He was appointed to his chair of theology the same day as Thomas Aquinas, on October 23, 1256. For local reasons, the University deferred their accession to the degree of Doctor and their right officially to occupy their chairs until October, 1257. By that time, Bonaventure had already been named General Minister of his Order and was never to resume his teaching activities. He died toward the end of the Council of Lyons, July 15, 1274, the same year as Thomas Aquinas.—Works. Main works: *Commentary on the Sentences* (1250-1255), *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, *Breviloquium*, *Collationes in Hexaemeron*; several important disputed questions should also be consulted. Standard edition: S. Bonaventurae . . . *Opera omnia*, Quaracchi, 10 vols., 1882-1902. The commentary on the *Sentences*, minus the notes, has been reprinted in 4 vols., Quaracchi, 1934 ff. Also separately published: *Tria Opuscula*, Quaracchi, 3 ed., 1911 (*Breviloquium*, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, *De reductione artium ad theologiam*).—*Collationes in Hexaemeron*, Quaracchi, 1934 (in another redaction than that of the *Opera omnia*).—*Questions disputées "De caritate, De novissimis,"* ed. P. Glorieux, Paris, 1950.—Engl. transl. of *Sent.*, I, 3, 1, in R. McKeon, *Selections*, II, 118-148.—BET., 720-742.

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ABHL., 3 (1928) 141-161. B. Rosenmöller, *Die religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, Münster i. W., 1925 (Beiträge, 25, 3-4). C. J. O'Leary, *The Substantial Composition of Man according to St. Bonaventure*, Washington, 1931. J. Kaup, *Zur Konkurslehre des Petrus Olivi und des hl. Bonaventura*, FS., 19 (1932) 315-336. E. Szaduj, *St. Bonaventure et le problème du rapport entre l'âme et le corps*, France Franciscaine, 15 (1932) 283-310. F. Immler, *Gott und Geist. Zusammenwirken des geschaffenen und des ungeschaffenen Geistes im höheren Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, Werl i. W., 1934; *Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele bei den Franziskanertheologen des 13. Jahrhunderts*, FS., 24 (1937) 284-294. L. Jesberger, *Das Abhängigkeitsverhältnis des hl. Thomas Aquinas von Albertus Magnus und Bonaventura im dritten Buche des Sentenzenkommentars*, Würzburg, 1936 (Inaug.-Diss.). F. Tinivella OFM., *De impossibili sapientiae adfectione in philosophia pagana iuxta "Collationes in Hexaemeron"* S. Bonaventurae, Antonianum, 11 (1936) 27-59, 135-186, 277-318. P. Robert OFM., *Hyléomorphisme et devenir chez S. Bonaventure*, Montréal, 1936. J. Bittre-mieux, *Distinctio inter essentialia et esse apud S. Bonaventuram*, Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses, 14 (1937) 302-307. H. Legowicz, *Essai sur la philosophie sociale du docteur Séraphique*, Fribourg (Suisse), 1937. E. Longpré OFM., art. *Bonaventure*, DHGE., 9 (1937) 741-788. C. M. O'Donnell, *The Psychology of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas*, Washington, 1937. S. Clasen, *Der hl. Bonaventura und das Mendikantentum. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte des Pariser Mendikantenstretes (1252-1272)*, Werl i. W., 1940. L. Veuthey, S. *Bonaventurae philosophia christiana*, Rome, 1943 (bibliography pp. XV-XXI). M. M. de Benedictis, *The Social Thought of Saint Bonaventure*, Washington, 1946. R. Lazzarini, *San Bonaventura, filosofo e mistico del Cristianesimo*, Milano, 1946. Z. Alszegey, *Grundformen der Liebe. Die Theorie der Gottesliebe bei dem hl. Bonaventura*, Roma, 1946. A. Sépinski, *La psychologie du Christ chez saint Bonaventura*, Paris, 1948. I. Hilsop, OP., *Introduction to St. Bonaventure's Theory of Knowledge*, Dominican Studies, 2 (1949) 46-55. F. Co-pleston, II, 250-292. A. Pisvin OFM., *L'intuition sensible selon S. Bonaventura*, SRHC., 367-378. T. Szabo, OFM., *De distinctionis formalis origine Bonaven-*

turiana . . . , SRHC., 381-445. A. de Villamonte, *El argumento de "Razones necesarias" en San Buenaventura*, Barcelona, Estudios Franciscanos, 1952. G. Bonafede, *Il pensiero francescano nel secolo XIII*, Palermo, 1952. L. Veuthey, *Le problème de l'existence de Dieu chez saint Bonaventure*, Antonianum, 28 (1953) 19-38. R. Messner, *Ueber die Gegenwartsbedeutung der Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras und Ockhams*, Antonianum, 28 (1953) 131-147.

¹¹ *I Sent.*, 8, 1, 1, 2, Concl.; I, 153. *De mysterio Trinitatis*, I, 1, 22; V, 47.

¹² *De mysterio Trinitatis*, I, 1, 29; V, 1.

¹³ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, 3, 1; approved by Bonaventure *Sent.*, 8, 1, 1, 2, Concl.; I, 154. *De mysterio Trinitatis*, I, 1, fund. 2; V, 15.

¹⁴ *II Sent.*, 25, 2, un., 6, Concl.; II, 6. Cf. *Itinerarium*, II, 4; pp. 305-306. *reductione artium ad theologiam*, 8, 374.

¹⁵ *II Sent.*, 7, 2, 2, 1, Concl.; II, 1 and note 3. Cf. 24, 1, 2, 4, Concl.; 569, and ad 5m, 571-572. *In Hexameron*, VII, 2; V, 365. *De donis Spiritus Sancti*, IV, 2; V, 474.

¹⁶ *Sermo IV de rebus theologicis*, 18, V, 572.

¹⁷ *De scientia Christi*, IV, ad 2am, 26. On divine illumination, *De scientia Christi*, IV, Concl.; V, 23. *In Hexameron*, II, 10; V, 338. The plenary of divine illumination is mystical contemplation. The names given by Bonaventure to the mystical powers of the soul be taken up by Eckhart (*apex mentis*, etc.). They came to Bonaventure, Thomas Gallus. On their Greek origin, E. van Ivanka, *Apex mentis, Wort und Wandlung eines stoischen Terminus*, ZKT., 72 (1950) 123-176.

¹⁸ The Index of the Quaracchi edition of Bonaventure's commentary on the *Metaphysics* lists more than one thousand references to the works of Aristotle (pp. 266-267) covering the whole range of Aristotle's writings from the *Organon* to the *Problemata*.—On our own interpretation of the attitude of Bonaventure toward Aristotle: *La philosophie de Bonaventure*, 3 ed., Paris, 1953, p. 133, p. 153, pp. 158-159.

¹⁹ Definition of creation, *II Sent.*, 1, 2, Concl.; II, 22. *Breviloquium*, 3; ed. min., 61. The notion of creation is unknown to Aristotle, *II Sent.*, 1, 2, Concl.; II, 16-17, and dist. 1, dubium II, 37. At a later date, *In Hexameron*, VI, 4; V, 36. Against the eternity of the world, *II Sent.*, 1, 1, 2; the argument of Bonaventure in favor of the creation of the world in time (*II Sent.*, 1, 1, 2).

are criticized by Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, 46, 2.

²⁰ *In I Sent.*, 8, 2, un., 2, Concl.; I, 168 and *II Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, Concl. 1; II, 90-91. Creatures are composed of *ens* and *esse*, because, apart from God, all that is "receives its existence (*esse*) from somewhere else"; consequently, "nothing is its own being." This is not the doctrine of the composition of *esse* and *essentia* we will meet in the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. See G. P. Klubertanz SJ., *Esse and existeret in St. Bonaventure*, MS., 8 (1946) 169-188.

²¹ *II Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 1, Concl. 3a; II, 91.

²² *II Sent.*, 3, 1, 2, 3, Concl.; II, 109-110. Cf. 18, 1, 3; II, 441.

²³ Hylomorphic composition of the soul, *II Sent.*, 17, 1, 2, Concl.; II, 414-415. Consequently the soul is a distinct substance, mainly owing to its form, *II Sent.*, 3, 1, 2, 3, fund. 3; II, 108; its individuation results from the whole compound, *II Sent.*, 18, 2, 1, ad 1m; II, 447.—On the history of the problem, E. Kleineidam, *Das Problem . . .*, Breslau, 1930. O. Lotz, *La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles*, RNSP., 34 (1932) 21-41 (early history of the problem; Roland of Cremona, Philip the Chancellor, A. of Hales, Odo Rigaud; on Bonaventure, p. 40).

²⁴ *II Sent.*, 17, 2, 2, ad 6m; II, 423. *In Hexameron*, II, 2; V, 336. "To say that the ultimate form is added to prime matter . . . without any intermediate form, is insane." The language is harder than it was in 1250, but it is the same position.—Several different interpretations of Bonaventure's general attitude with respect to Aristotle are found in: I. Squadrini, *S. Bonaventura philosophus christianus*, Antonianum, 16 (1941) 103-130, 205-252. P. Robert, *Le problème de la philosophie bonaventurienne*, Laval théologique et philosophique, 6 (1950) 161, and 6 (1951) 57, 58 additional note. F. Van Steenberghe, *Siger de Brabant . . .*, considers that, "in philosophy, Augustinism is one of the sources of his (Bonaventure's) thought, but a secondary one as compared with Aristotelianism," p. 464; accordingly, "in philosophy (not in theology) the doctrine of Bonaventure is an authentic Aristotelianism" (sic, italics

not ours); it is "a neoplatonizing Aristotelianism," p. 464; finally, it is "an eclectic and neoplatonizing Aristotelianism at the service of an Augustinian theology," p. 464. A. Da Vinca, OFM., Cap., *L'aspetto filosofico dell'aristotelismo di S. Bonaventura*, CF., 19 (1949) 5-44 (does not consider Bonaventure an Aristotelian).

²⁵ EUSTACHIUS OF ARRAS OFM., bishop of Coutances, d. 1291. He has left sermons, *Quodlibeta*, and perhaps a commentary on the *Sentences*. Three Questions have been published in *De humanae cognitionis ratione anecdota quaedam*, Quaracchi, 1883, pp. 183-195. See also P. Glorieux, in France Franciscaine, 13 (1930) 125-171; GLOREP., II, 78-82; GLOLIT., II, 77-81. An impressive witness to the reality of the Franciscan school is the ms. studied by V. Doucet, *Quaestiones centum . . .*, AFH., 26 (1933) 183-202, 474-496; cf. AFH., 27 (1934) 547.

Eustachius distinguishes between the "general" and the "special" influence of God. Under his special influence, the soul of some men immediately attains to the immediate intuition of the divine essence (*De humanae cognitionis ratione . . .*, p. 184). The general influence of God does not suffice to achieve this result without the added influence of divine "rules," in whose light we judge things without seeing the uncreated Truth itself: "per istas regulas vel irradiationes mentis directivas iudicat mens de omnibus et tamen non videt illam Veritatem incretam, cuius sunt expressae similitudines," pp. 186-187. Through species, the substantial forms of things are presented by the senses to the intellect which receives them as possible intellect and sees them as agent intellect. Since it is an active power with a twofold virtue, or force (*vis*), the intellect "acts upon these species, and forms them and makes them intelligible in act," p. 191. Knowledge and love are *habitus* conatural to the soul. They are consubstantial with the soul and emanate from its substance in which they are rooted. Otherwise, the soul could not act through them nor direct itself toward its end, which is God (p. 193). Everything Eustachius says is confirmed by the authority "egregii Doctoris Augustini," p. 194.—Introduction to the history of the problem: M. Grabmann, *Zur Erkenntnislehre der älteren Franziskanerschule*, FS., 4 (1917) 105-

118; documents interesting for the speculative background of this historical problem, pp. 119-126.

²⁶ WALTER OF BRUGES, OFM., Bishop of Poitiers (1276), died in 1307. On his unpublished works, GLOREP., II, 84-86. A series of 22 Questions has been published by E. Longpré, *Questions disputatae* du B. Gauthier de Bruges, Louvain, 1928. On the unprinted parts of his commentary on Peter Lombard, A. Pelzer, *Le commentaire de Gauthier de Bruges sur le quatrième livre des Sentences*, in RTAM., 2 (1930) 327-334. E. Longpré, *Le commentaire sur les Sentences* du B. Gauthier de Bruges (1225-1307), Etudes d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du XIII^e siècle, Paris, 1932, 5-24; *Questions inédites du commentateur sur les Sentences de Gauthier de Bruges*, AHDL., 7 (1932) 251-275.

The 22 Questions published by E. Longpré are devoted to ethical problems and moral theology. This seems to have been the center of his speculative interests. Note the questions III-VI, particularly interesting concerning his doctrine of the will. Walter stresses the fact that the will, inasmuch as it is deliberative, is not necessitated by the desirable object offered to it by reason (p. 39). Following mainly Augustine, Anselm and Bernard of Clairvaux, he strongly stresses the radical independence of the will (p. 51) and its ruling authority (pp. 60-61). The three questions extracted from his commentary on the *Sentences*, Bk. I, and published by the same historian give a better idea of the place of Walter in the theological movement of his time. His proofs of the existence of God follow Algazel, *Metaphysics*, I, 5), of the moving causes (he does not quote Aristotle, but Boethius, *De consol. philos.*, IV, prosa 6), of the connection and ontological indigence of things (quotes Plato, *Timaeus*), and of the universal order (AHDL., 7 (1932) 260-261). In what sense the existence of God is demonstrable, and in what senses it is not, pp. 263-264 (note, p. 263, n. 2, the Augustinian and Bonaventurian flavor of the doctrine). The soul is composed of form and of spiritual or intelligible matter; Walter affirms this on the authority of "philosophers" and of "saints," that is, on the one side, Aristotle (sic), Avicenna and Gabirol, and, on the other side, Au-

gustine, Damascene and Boethius. Moson Maimonides and the *Liber XXIV philosophorum* are less easy to classify (p. 270). Note, p. 271, n. 1, the text of William of La Mare in which the same position is maintained. In William, matter is the cause of the possibility of non-existence to be found in all creatures, hence their composition "quae est ex actu existendi et potentia ad non esse."—R. Hofman, *Die Gewissenslehre des Walter von Brügge OFM., und die Entwicklung der Gewissenslehre in der Hochscholastik*, Münster i. W., 1941 (Beiträge, 36). Particular studies: E. Longpré, *Gauthier de Bruges XIII^e siècle*, Miscellanea Ehrle, I, Rome, 1924, 190-218. S. Belmond, *La preuve de l'existence de Dieu d'après Gauthier de Bruges*, RFNS., 25 (1933) 410-425.

²⁷ MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA OFM., born ca. 1240; studied at Paris (in 1268 or slightly earlier), became a master at the same university (1275-1276), then taught at Bologna and succeeded John Peckham as a master in theology at the Pontifical Curia (1279). General Minister of the Franciscan Order (1287-1290), Cardinal (1288), he carried out several diplomatic missions up to the time of his death (Rome, October 29, 1302). These dates are those of a career contemporary with the incipient post-Thomistic doctrinal controversies. GLOP., II, 104-108. GLOREP., 102-107.—Texts in A. Daniels, *Quellenbeilage und Untersuchungen*, 52-63 (*Sent.* I, dist. 2). M. Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae soluta*; I, *Quaestiones de fide et de cognitione*, Quaracchi, 1903; vol I also contains *Tractatus de excellentia sacrae scripturae*, pp. 1-22; *Sermo de studio sacrae scripturae*, pp. 22-36; *De aeterna praesentia Spiritus Sancti*, pp. 429-453. II, III, *Quaestiones disputatae de Gratia*, Quaracchi, 1935 (important Introduction by V. Doucet). *Quaestiones de Christo*, Quaracchi, 1914; E. Longpré, *Thomas d'Aquin et Mathieu d'Aquasparta. Textes inédits sur le problème de la création*, AHDL., I (1926-1927) 293-308. L. Amorós, *La teología como ciencia práctica en los tiempos que preceden a Escoto*, AHDL., 9 (1934) 261-303. Engl. transl. of *Disputations. I On Knowledge*, McKeon, *Soliloquies*, II, 240-302.—On his doctrinal GDP., 761-762. I. Jeller, *Disseratio* . . . in *De humanae cognitionis ratione*, Quaracchi, 1883. M. Grabmann, *Die phi-*

losophische und theologische Erkenntnislehre des Kardinals Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, Wien, 1906. E. Longpré, art. 375-389. H. D. Simonin, *La connaissance humaine des singuliers matériels d'après les maîtres franciscains au XIII^e siècle*, MM., 1930, II, 289-303. A. C. Pegis, *Matthew of Aquasparta and the Cognition of Non-Being*, SRHC., 463-480. J. Auer, *Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Kardinals Matteo d'Aquasparta. I, Das Wesen der Gnade*, Freiburg i. Br., 1942. Cf. J. Rohmer, AHDL., 3 (1928) 161-177.

²⁸ Judging from the specimen published by Aug. Daniels, the proofs of the existence of God alleged in the *Sentences* are sketchy. Matthew argues from the "origin, the multitude, the order and the movement" of beings (A. Daniels, pp. 55-56). In qu. III, where he asks if the existence of God is an "indubitable truth," he resorts to Augustine's *Soliloquies*, I, 8 (PL., 32, 877) and to Anselm's *Proslogion* in order to establish that God cannot be conceived as non-existing. Yet this is not given as a proof; it follows the proofs already given. Pages 60-63 contain interesting combinations of Anselm and Bonaventure (or Augustine); cf. Daniels, pp. 159-161. All the theologians who admit the presence in man of an innate idea of God do not use it as a proof of God's existence; some of them resort to it in order to prove that, once acquired by demonstration, this truth becomes a sort of self-evident notion.

²⁹ The soul is the act and perfection of the body, and not only the soul, but the intellect (*Quaestiones de fide et cognitione*, pp. 425-426); to actualize the body "is not the prime being of the soul, otherwise it would have no being once separated from the body" (p. 392, ad 12); nevertheless, separated from its body, it does not exist in a condition that perfectly suits its nature (pp. 425-426). On the *colliguntia* between soul and body, *Qu. de Christo*, p. 62, ad 16.

³⁰ See, *Qu. de fide*, p. 409, ad 14, where Matthew concedes to Avicenna (*Metaph.*, IX, 2) that "the intellect seeks pure goodness," but adds that, because the philosophers have had a taste of divine contemplation, and no taste of divine love,

they mentioned the speculative felicity only, not the affective one.

³¹ On the various doctrines concerning the nature of the human intellect (Alexander, Themistius, Avicenna, Avempace and Alfarrabi), *Qu. de fide*, pp. 348-350. Matthew considers them as refuted by Averroes, but what interests him are the positions of the theologians indulging in philosophy. Some of them take up the division of Averroes: *intellectus possibilis, speculativus, agens* and *adeptus*. The possible intellect and the agent intellect are powers conatural to the human soul; they are separated, but the agent intellect still more so than the possible intellect. This position is that of great men in philosophy and theology (Albert the Great?), yet it is not too safe (p. 351); for so long as the soul is in its body, it cannot unite with the separate substances; now this should be possible according to this position. Let us maintain, with Augustine, that we can know the existence of such substances, not their nature (pp. 352-353).

³² The ambiguity of the twofold meaning of *intellectus* (understanding or the understood) is often a cause of obscurity in such texts: "illa species . . . tunc est quodammodo apta intellectui, et dicitur esse *intellectus in potentia* a Commentatore (Averroes). Intellectus agens, quo est omnia facere, transformatur eam in intellectum possibilem et facit eam intellectam actu; et illud vocat Philosophus abstrahere," p. 287. The main point is that the soul undergoes nothing from sensible bodies, "sed potius facit ex illis et de illis, et format sibi species aptas et proportionatas secundum exigentiam organorum et virtutum, quousque det sibi esse intelligibile et coaptet eam et format sive transformet eam in intellectum possibilem, quo est omnia fieri," p. 287. Cf. pp. 288-291, including the doctrine of the "connextio potentialium et virtutum."—On the fundamental activity of the intellect, F. Prezioso, *L'attività del soggetto pensante nella gnoseologia di Matteo d'Aquasparta e di Rugiero Marston*, Antonianum, 25 (1950) 259-326.

³³ Since, according to Avicenna, essences are indifferent to existence and non-existence ("quidditas indifferenter se habet ad esse et non-esse") the intellectual cognition of non-existent is possible (*Qu. de*

fide, p. 231); the quiddity then is the object of the intellect. Yet, this object would be just a concept; in order to avoid this consequence, Matthew resorts to theology (p. 231) and assigns to the intellect for its object "the quiddity conceived by our intellect, but related to the art, that is to an eternal exemplar, inasmuch as, touching our mind, it acts as a mover," p. 233. The Augustinian doctrine of the divine illumination follows. The divine ideas are not the sole cause of intellectual knowledge (against Plato), but they cause it (against Aristotle); following Bonaventure, Matthew posits the divine Ideas as the "objectum motuum" (p. 254) which, acting upon the data of sense knowledge (a necessary element), makes us see the immutable truths. We see by this divine light, we do not see it (p. 254). A detailed examination of these texts would confirm that, about 1270, Thomas Aquinas already had adversaries well informed of his positions; for instance, p. 251, Thomas is certainly one of the "philosophantes" in question. — Against the separate Intelligence of Avicenna, p. 278. That we know singulars (against Thomas, p. 308) through singular species and universals through universal species, pp. 309-310. (On this point, cf. Roger Bacon, *Opus tertium*, ch. 35, Brewer ed., p. 115). That the soul knows itself and its *habitus*, if not at the beginning of its knowledge, at least after it has gone beyond phantasms, pp. 329-334.

³⁴ See especially, *Quaestiones de Christo*, qu. IX, where Matthew discusses the question: is there only one *esse* in Christ? Matthew answers in the affirmative. He avails himself of this occasion to restate the doctrine of the plurality of forms. One could not wish for a clearer statement of the relation between the two positions: plurality of forms, plurality of *esse*. In doctrines like these, in which *esse* does not mean the "act of being," but just entity, several substantial forms entail several *esse*. This, Matthew says, is the common opinion of the Parisian Masters: "Quilibet homo, quamvis unus homo sit, tamen in uno et eodem homine sunt plura *esse*, quia plures formae substantiales perficientes secundum diversos gradus *essendi*, et per quas reponitur in diversis generibus gradatim ordinatis, secundum communem sententiam Magistrorum Parisiensium," p. 167. The contrary

opinion (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, III, 17, 1 and 2) has been condemned by the Parisian Masters as unsound and not agreeing with faith, pp. 168-169. And indeed, there was at the time (1270) a strong opposition against the doctrine of the unity of the substantial form in composite substances, especially man.

³⁵ BARTHOLOMEW OF BOLOGNA OF GLOREP, II, 108-109. V. Doucet, *AT* 27 (1934) 550. E. Longpré, *Bartholomaeus de Bologna*, Studi Francescani, 1923, pp. 384. Studied philosophy and taught theology at the University of Paris. Succeeded Matthew of Aquasparta as master in theology at Bologna (1282). He loses his trace after 1294. His *35 Quaestiones disputatae* are dated about 1280 at Paris (Glorieux, p. 108). The *De sententia de luce Fr. Bartholomei de Bona*, Antonianum 7 (1932) 201-238, 337-465-494. The text of the *Quaestiones disputatae de fide, de sensu, de intellectu* has been published by M. Mückhoff, *Quaestiones disputatae de fide, de sensu, de intellectu von Bologna OFM*, Münster i. W., 1940 (Beiträge, 24, 4). We do not have been able to find this volume, probably destroyed during the last war. A little-studied Franciscan of the 13th period, is the elusive WILLIAM OF GUERRES OFM. (Guillelmus de Falco, *De vita et operibus*). On his life and works, GLOREP, II, 127; GLOREP, II, 112-113. V. Doucet, *AT* 27 (1934) 550; his identification with PETER OF FALCO OFM., suggested by P. Glorieux (France Franciscaine, 1929) 257-289 has been opposed by A. Théry OFM., *De vita et operibus de Falco*, Sophia, 8 (1940) 28-45 and A. Heyse OFM., *Pierre de Falco, un être identifié avec Guillaume de Falco OFM.*, AFH., 33 (1940) 241-267.

³⁶ ROGER MARSTON OFM.—On his life and works, see the introduction to hisputed Questions: *Fr. Rogeri Marston OFM., Quaestiones disputatae*, Quinch, 1932 (life, VIII-XXXIV, with XXXV-LI, doctrine, LI-LXXXIX), tract from *Quodlibet II*, qu. 22, in berto Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediae*, . . . , pp. 180-199.—A. G. Little, *Opus 93-95*, GLOREP, II, 264-266. BIBLIOGRAPHY.—F. Feilster, *Roger Marston OFM. (d. 1303) ein englischer Vertreter des Augustinismus*, Scholastik, 3 (1928)

556. E. Gilson, *Roger Marston, un cas d'Augustinisme avicennais*, *AHDL.*, 8 (1932) 37-42; *Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustiniennne*, *RNSP.*, 36 (1934) 321-331. J. Carola, *L'opposizione a S. Tommaso nelle Quaestiones disputatae di Ruggero Marston*, *SRHC.*, 449-460. P. A. Faustino Prezioso, *L'attività del soggetto pensante nella gnoseologia di Matteo d'Aquasparta e di Ruggero Marston*, Antonianum, 25 (1950), reprint pp. 1-69 (excellent; note Marston's criticism of Henry of Ghent's rejection of intelligible species, 36-42; against Giles of Rome, 42-44; influence of Marston's note, 45-50).

³⁷ References to *Quaestiones disputatae*, Quaracchi, 1932.—Roger opposes to the *Sacrae theologiae philosophantes* (the philosophizers), p. 360. This distinction is seldom taken in a sense favorable to the "philosophizing theologians." (E. Gilson, *Les Philosophantes*, *AHDL.*, 19 (1952) 135-140).—Matter has its own being (p. 208). Whether or not the soul has matter is not clear in his texts; he does not seem to commit himself, pp. 361, 364. United to a body, the soul exists *per se* and, consequently, it is immortal, p. 361. Even if it had matter, it would still be immortal (*ibid.*). There are "rationes seminales" in natural beings (an incidental statement), p. 173, ad 22m. The supreme power of the soul is the intellect, which is both passive and active, pp. 325, ad 8; 348, ad 11m, etc. Its passive power is the possible intellect, p. 387; its active and illuminating power is the agent intellect, which acts upon the phantasms as light upon colors; it purifies them and enables them to "multiply" up to the possible intellect; apart from Aristotle, no philosopher has ever made this distinction (pp. 386-387); it does not seem to agree with the intention of Augustine (p. 387), whose doctrine of sensation Roger maintains (pp. 387-396), together with the Augustinian doctrine of the divine illumination: Alfarabi, Avicenna, perhaps Aristotle himself, posit the agent intellect as a separate substance (p. 258); in Aristotle's *De anima*, III, 5, it is said that the agent intellect is eternally knowing all things by actual knowledge; this, which applies to God alone, agrees with the Catholic truth and the doctrine of Augustine, so it should not be denied (p. 258). Nevertheless, this language is philosophical, and if we say that "the

agent intellect . . . is a separate substance, namely, God himself" (p. 259); we should understand it in the sense of Augustine's doctrine of the divine illumination (important text, p. 260). Man knows all in a light derived from the eternal light, which the soul sees in itself, and which is distinct from the light of its own agent intellect, pp. 252-258. Against those who garble the texts of Augustine (probably Thomas Aquinas) see his indignant reaction, pp. 255-256; p. 262: "Sic igitur . . . and p. 273, "Haec idcirco dixerim. . . ." On the internal difficulties met by the Franciscan school concerning the natural or supernatural nature of the divine illumination, E. Gilson, *Sur quelques difficultés*, . . . , p. 329, n. 7. Note that the problem was not simply to choose between a "general" and a "special" illumination, but between a "grace" and a "natural gift."

³⁸ PETER OLIEU OFM (*Petrus Joannis Olivii*), born at Sérignan (France) about 1248; entered the Franciscan Order about 1260 (he heard Saint Bonaventure in 1268); had to retract 22 propositions concerning monastic poverty (1283); after years spent in controversies on the subject, he died at Narbonne, March 14, 1298. On life and works: GLOREP, II, 205-211; GLOREP, II, 127-134. V. Doucet, *AFH.*, 27 (1936) 555-556; 28 (1935) 156-197, 408-442. The main published texts are: *Petri Joannis Olivii Provenalis Quodlibeta*, Venice, 1509 (we have not seen this edition). B. Jansen, *Petrus Joannis Olivii OFM., Quaestiones in Ilim librum Sententiarum*, 3 vols., Quaracchi, 1922, 1924, 1926; a model edition with perfect doctrinal tables (III, 583-617). D. Laberge, *P. Joannis Olivii intra scripta eius apologetica*, in *AFH.*, 28 (1935) 115-155. F. Delorme, *Fr. Petri Joannis Olivii tractatus "De perlegendis philosophorum libris"*, Antonianum, 16 (1941) 31-44. Abbreviations of some questions of Olieu (*Memoria P. J. Olivii*) in F. Delorme, *Vitalis de Furno Quodlibeta intra*, 249-260. On his philosophical doctrines: GDP., 763; especially a series of studies by Bern. Jansen, SJ., *Die Lehre Olivii über das Verhältnis von Leib und Seele*, FS., 5 (1918) 153-175, 233-258; *Die Erkenntnistheorie Olivii*, Berlin, 1921 (bibliography, IX-XIII); *Die Unsterblichkeitsbeweise Olivii und ihre philosophiegeschichtliche Bedeutung*, FS., 9 (1922) 49-69; *Die Seelenlehre Olivii und ihre Verurteilung*

auf dem Viennener Konzil, FS., 21 (1934). 297-314; *Der Augustinismus des Petrus Johannis Olivi*, ADGM., 878-895.—J. Koch, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des P. J. Olivi*, RTAM., 2 (1930) 290-310. L. Jarreau, *Pierre Jean Olivi, sa vie, sa doctrine*, Etudes françaises, 45 (1933) 129-153, 277-298, 513-529. F. Callacey, art. *Olivi* on Olib, DTC., 11 (1931) 982-991. P. G. Ricci, *Pietro Olivi e la pluralità delle forme sostanziali*, Studi Francescani, 8, (1936) 225-239; *Pietro Olivi e l'unità sostanziale dell'uomo*, Studi Francescani, 9 (1937) 51-95. L. Seidel, *Natur und Person. Metaphysische Probleme bei Petrus Olivi*, Würzburg, 1938. B. Echeverría, *El problema de la alma humana en la Edad Media. Pedro de Olivi y la definición del Concilio de Vienne*, Buenos Aires, 1941. O. Lottin, PEM., II, 254-260.

On the question whether the doctrine of Olivi himself was condemned at the Council of Vienne, the negative is upheld by L. Jarreau OFM., *Pierre Jean Olivi*, op. cit., p. 528, and in the fundamental study of E. Müller OFM., *Das Konzil von Vienne 1311-1312. Seine Quellen und seine Geschichte*, Münster i. W., 1934. The contrary view, more generally accepted, finds justifications in J. Koch, *Das Gutachten des Aegidius Romanus über die Lehren des Petrus Johannis Olivi. Eine neue Quelle zum Konzil von Vienne (1311-1312)*, Scientia sacra, Theologische Festgabe—K. J. Schulte, Cologne, 1935, pp. 142-168; B. Jansen, *Ein neues gewichtiges Zeugnis über die Verurteilung Olivis*, Scholastik, 10 (1935) 406-408. L. Amorós, *Aegidii Romani impugnatio doctrinae Petri Johannis Olivi an. 1311-1312, nunc primum in lucem edita*, AFH., 27 (1934) 399-431; there is little doubt that the doctrine of Olivi himself was then condemned.

³⁸ The composition of matter and form in angels and souls is maintained by Olivi, even at this late date, as the "more common opinion." *Quaestiones*, Quaracchi ed., I, 304-330. His authorities on this point are Aristotle (sic), Augustine and Boethius "christianissimus theologus": I, 318-320, and II, 325-327. He does not quote Gabirol. Olivi's position implies that matter is an act, or an "actuality" distinct in itself from the other kind of art called "form," I, 305-306. On the universality of the composition of matter and form, including souls, pp. 315-316.—On the plurality of forms in man. II, 29-

35; note the concluding remark: "before I simply hold that, in the human body, besides the soul, there are other forms really different from the soul." I even believe that all the formal degrees which are in it contribute to constitute one perfect form, the principal and to say the form and root of all the other forms, being the one that comes last." 35.—That the intellectual soul of man is not the form *per se* of the body, II, 126. Note, p. 111, that "if the soul the intellective form, is the form of the body, it cannot possibly be intellectual and free, and immortal and separate from the body." This union is a "contingent," yet not a "formal" one. "Intimate and very strong, yet not intimate," II, 537.—Incidentally, let us note that Olivi is an interesting witness to disputes concerning the composition of esse and essence. To posit the essence's potency to esse, its act, is "absurd." The distinction of Boethius between *quod est* is not absurd, but it simply points out the composition of matter and substantial form, I, 154. Olivi's case is timely warning for us to remember the Thomistic composition of essence and existence will meet a two-fold opposition coming from two opposite quarters: the Aristotelians, who could find room for it in the metaphysics of the totle, and their adversaries, the representatives of the traditional theology, did not need it. Olivi belongs to the latter group. Another "Augustinian"ness to this type of opposition: an anonymous author studied by G. E. Hardt, *Die Lehrschrift des Cod. Bibl. nat. 16407. Ein Beitrag zum Augustinismus der Hochscholastik*, ADG 792-825, particularly 813. To this theologian, the composition of essence and existence means nothing: "Sed hoc est." This document is extremely interesting.

⁴⁰ The main texts of Olivi on this are to be found in his *Quaestiones de cognoscendo*, published by B. Jansen, Appendix to vol. III, pp. 455-554. In II, after maintaining the doctrine of Augustine against those among the "magis," Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. theol.* 5, Resp., who pretend that, on point, he was a Platonist (I, 503), Olivi adds that, in so far as he himself concerned, he adheres to it under conditions: 1, the divine ideas should

be said to be the "forms" of our intellect; 2, they should not be posited as representing to us intelligible objects as immediately "seen" and "known." So much for the object of cognition, and now for its mode: 3, the divine light should not be considered a "natural" principle of cognition, either total or partial and instrumental; 4, the intellect itself should not be deprived of its natural aptitude to grasp absolutely certain truth; 5, we should also beware not to posit the knowledge of all things as innate in the human intellect. Conclusion (III, 512-513): "Not knowing how to explain away these difficulties, I merely present them as errors to be avoided, for indeed, although the said position is in itself famous and sound, it might become very dangerous if these points were not carefully observed. For this reason, I hold the said position taken in itself, because it is that of very famous men, and I leave it to their wisdom to deal with the aforesaid difficulties." Some say that Olivi was giving up the doctrine without daring to say so; but he was giving up the doctrine of the *rationes seminales* without hesitating to say so (I, 515-551); moreover, he explicitly says he maintains it, only he does not fully know on what grounds. He is a puzzled man.—His short treatise "On the Reading of the Books of the Philosophers" is exactly in the spirit of the last writings of Saint Bonaventure; see Antonianum, 16 (1941) 37-44.

⁴¹ The solidarity of the powers of the soul is not a theory proper to Olivi, but he has made it his own by his treatment of it: II, 546-547; III, 30-39; III, 274-275. On Olivi's doctrine of motion, B. Jansen, *Olivi der älteste scholastische Vertreter des heutigens Bewegungsbegriffs*, PJ., 33 (1920) 137-152.—On the history of the condemnations of Olivi and his successors, L. Amorós OFM., *Series condemnationum et processuum contra doctrinam et sequaces Petri Joannis Olivi (e cod. Vat. Ottob. lat. 1810)*, AFH., 24 (1931) 495-512.

⁴² PETER OF TRABES OFM.—Born at Trabes, near Bazas, France (*Petrus de Trabibus*) is still little known and deserves to be more closely studied.—GLO-LIT., II, 229-332. E. Longpré, *Pietro de Trabibus, un discepolo di Pier Giovanni Olivi*, Studi Francescani, 19 (1942) n. 3, extract 1-24; same author, *Nuovi docu-*

menti per la storia dell' Agostinismo Francescano, Studi Francescani, 1933, 314-350 (see pp. 329-350, questions by an alleged disciple of Peter of Trabes, more Augustinian than his master: 332-336; Alfarrabi and Avicenna support Augustine, p. 336). B. Jansen, *Petrus de Trabibus, seine spekulative Eigenart oder sein Verhältnis zu Olivi*, Festgabe Clemens Baumer, Münster i. W., 1923, 243-254. A. Ledoux, *Petri de Trabibus OFM., Quaestiones duo de aeternitate mundi*, Antonianum, 6 (1931) 137-152. A. Teetate, art. *Pierre de Trabes*, DTC., 12 (1933) 2049-2064. M. Schmaus, *Des Petrus de Trabibus Lehre über das göttliche Vorwissen und die Prädestination*, Antonianum, 10 (1935) 121-148. O. Lottin, PEM., II, 254-260. G. Gal, *Commentarius Petri de Trabibus in IV libros Sententiarum Petri de Tarentasia falso inscriptus*, AFH., 45 (1952) 241-278.

Peter rejects the composition of essence and esse "tanquam ex diversis naturis" (Jansen, 247). Esse adds nothing real to essence, but only "alium modum significandi et dicendi." Same remark concerning individuation; its cause is the cause of its existence; it adds nothing to the essence, "cujus individuatō dicitur esse" (ibid., cf. Olivi, whose doctrine will be rejected by Duns Scotus on this point). The human soul is a compound of matter and form; it contains several forms; the intellectual soul communicates with the body, but it is not its act (Jansen, 250-251). Peter seems to reduce the seminal reasons of Augustine to an active potentiality of matter (ibid., 251-252). Concerning the divine illumination, he acknowledges that the works of Augustine are full of it; he himself accepted it for a time, then he gave it up (see Olivi), at least in its strict interpretation, and simply maintained that God gives our intellect both being and light (ibid., 248). But his position remains very different from that of Thomas Aquinas. To Peter, since we should not unnecessarily add philosophy to the teaching of the "Saints," there is no reason to speak of a "possible" intellect nor of an "agent intellect". Our intellect is an active possibility (*possibilitas activa*). It can form intelligible species of singulars or of universals according to its needs, and it can do this without having to receive sensible species from outside. This is the teaching of Augustine and of the Saints whose authority theologians and Christians

should prefer to that of pagan philosophers (*Studi Francescani*, pp. 12-16). Against the distinction: possible-intellect, agent-intellect, op. cit., 19-21. Difficulties of Augustinian illumination, op. cit., 22.—On his opposition to the Averroistic doctrine of the unity of the intellect, see Ct. Krzanic, *Grandi lottatori contro l'averroismo*, in RENS., 22 (1950) 203-206.

⁴³ VITAL DU FOUR OFM (or vidal, *Vitalis de Furno*), birth date unknown; entered the Franciscan Order, taught theology at Paris (1292-1295, probably), then at Montpellier (1295-1297) and at Toulouse (1300); Cardinal-priest (1312) and Cardinal-Bishop (1321); died August 16, 1327. On his life and works, see HLF., 36 (1927) 295-305. GLOTT., II, 280-283; GLOREP., II, 137-140. V. Doucet, AFH., 27 (1934) 556-557.—F. Delorme, *Autour d'un apocryphe scottiste*, France Franciscaine, 8 (1925) 279-295; restores to Vital the partial authorship of the pseudo-Scotist *De rerum principio*. Same author: *L'oeuvre scolastique de maître Vital du Four d'après le ms. 95 de Todi*, France Franciscaine, 9 (1926) 421-471. Texts in: F. Delorme, *Le cardinal Vital du Four. Huit questions disputées sur le problème de la connaissance*, AHDL., 2 (1927) 151-337. E. Longpré, *Pour la défense de Duns Scot*, RENS., 18 (1926) 32-42; ascribes to Vital the *De rerum principio*, printed in several editions of Duns Scotus, for instance, *Opera omnia*, ed. Wadding, vol. III. P. Glorieux, *Pour en finir avec le De rerum principio*, AFH., 31 (1938) 225-234. F. Delorme, *Vitalis de Furno SRE. Card. Quodlibeta tria*, Roma, 1947 (Spicilegium Pontific. Athen. Antoniani V): on the life and works of Vital, Preface, pp. V-XXXII.

No distinction between existence and essence; refutation of the position of Thomas Aquinas, in AHDL., 2 (1927) 274-281. On the contrary: "esse non dicit aliquid absolutum additum essentiae creaturae ut ab ea differens et ei per creationem inhaerens ut forma materiae per generationem, sed est idem re absoluta cum essentia" (281). Existence is essence. Their distinction is one of reason only (282-283). When we know a non-existing thing, which is possible, the object is not non-being, which is impossible; it is the object as known by the intellect; in other words, it is the being of essence (*esse*

essentiae), that is the being of what can be made after the model of its exemplar in God (293-294).—The following references are to *De rerum principio*, in Duns Scot, *Opera omnia*, Paris, 1891-1898, vol. IV, pp. 267-471. The first number indicating the Question, will enable the reader to find the text in any one of the two other editions: *Opera omnia*, Lyon, 1639, III, pp. 1-207; or, separately, Quacquestiones, 1010. Proofs of God's existence by causality (Avicennian type but with an added pre-Scotist structure), qu. I, art. 2-4. God can directly produce many beings (against Avicenna), II, 1-4; 279-289. God acts by his free will, III, 3, 2; 301-302; against Avicenna, IV, 302-326. God alone can create (against Avicenna, Alf. rabi, Themistius etc.), VI, 334-346. Matter has actual entity (quotes Augustine *Conf.*, XII, 3 and XIII, 33) VII, 349-349; VIII, 364 ff. There is matter in angels and souls, I, 3, 268; VII, 2, 349-364. Prime matter is one and the same in all beings, VIII, 4, particularly 378: "Igitur autem ad positionem Avicembrii videtur . . .", as for me, I go back to the position of Gabriel; this statement, bitterly reproached to Duns Scotus, who never made it, will probably sound harmless now that its author is merely Vital du Four. The intellectual soul is the true and specific form of the body, LX, 2, 468-436; but it is not as intimately united to it as the sensitive soul, 415, 418; it is not the form of the organic body *quod organicum*, 423-426. The soul is identical with its powers, but it contains a plurality of forms, XI, 3, 468-482; cf. 468. Since essence and being of existence are one in nature, wherever there is a being of essence there is a being of existence: "ubique reperitur ratio essentialis". Incidentally, this is the reason why there are several *esse existentiae* in Christ, 717.

The *Quodlibeta tria* published by Vital delorme confirm what could be learnt from the *De rerum principio*: essence is individual by itself, without any addition, p. 21; the soul is one with powers, 28-29; on the unity of matter and the universal composition of matter and form, he refers to *De rerum principio*, VIII, 4 (ed. Fernandez) and points out that his authorities on this point are Boethius and Denis, not Aristotle, p. 90; souls as substances and as forms, pp. 114-115 (quoted as opinion held by some to justify the in-

qualities between souls, but he himself prefers to assert that souls are created unequal in themselves, not on account of their union with more or less perfect bodies, pp. 122-123; souls are not individuated by their bodies, p. 124; that only God can create, pp. 128-134 (note, p. 130 a clear reference to *De rerum principio*); maintains "seminial reasons" against Olieu, pp. 134-149; (note, p. 145, the connection with the problem of essence and existence); on the education of forms from matter, against Olieu, pp. 149-162; on the instantaneous propagation of light and its difficulties, pp. 163-173; that heavy bodies move faster when they approach the center of the earth, pp. 174-177.—If the *Memoria Vitalis de Furno*, published by Delorme, are to be trusted, they raise a curious question: how is it that, in this summary, Vital is supposed to have affirmed the real distinction of essence and existence (p. 247)? He denies it everywhere else.

⁴⁴ The following references are to the *Quacquestiones* published by Fr. Delorme in AHDL., 2 (1927); only the pages are indicated.—The intellectual soul is present to all the senses (165); although its proper object is the universal, it can contract and particularize itself; it knows whiteness in sight, sound in hearing, etc. (168); hence its cognition of the singular, owing to its accidental contraction and determination by sense perception (171). Against Giles of Rome and Thomas Aquinas, Vital maintains that our intellectual cognition of the singular is a direct apprehension of its existence (176). The object of the intellect is the "actualitas existentiae rei sensibilis per sensationem" (181); note the term "sensatio". It implies an "experimentatio de actualitate rei" (181). The intellect knows the singular before the universal (183).—Concerning the cognition of universals Vital sharply criticizes the usual interpretation of abstraction (177-178; 196-198). The possible-intellect and the agent-intellect are one and the same power (197); the process of abstraction is as follows: "The intellect gathers the species of the universal thing from all these species, namely: from that of the sensation, from the species of the sensible thing as it is in sense, then as it is in imagination; for indeed, sensation itself is immediately known, and since the intellect is a reflecting and comparing power, it

knows the quiddity in the sensation as universal or, if it knows the particular thing by a species which it gathers from sense or from imagination, it immediately considers that thing under the aspect of universality; thus, in understanding this color, it understands absolute color through the species of the agent produced in it. By the virtue of the (agent) intellect, the intelligible species can be multiplied in the (possible) intellect from the species that is in sense as well as from the species that is in imagination" (211). The intelligible species does not act upon the intellect, it is produced by it (224); the soul receives the sensible species from things, and, to that extent, the act of intellection is indirectly caused by them (227).

⁴⁵ Intuitive cognition of the soul by itself, as to its existence and essence (241-243). This intuitive cognition is accessible to a morally purified soul, according to Matthew of Aquasparta and Augustine (243-252); on this "sensus interior," p. 243. The divine light is not a seen object, it is the cause why we see the truth (331). It moves and it sharpens as if it were (332) without inhering in it as our intellect of its dispositions. It is a "ratio cognoscendi ut forma et species non inherens, sed mentem immutans ad intelligendum" (334); it is for our intellect an exemplar (334) which, together with the intelligible species abstracted from sense, makes up a perfect cause of true cognition. This solution, together with the notion of the intimate presence of the divine light to the soul, is borrowed from Henry of Ghent (335-336).

One of the many sources of Vital du Four is the little studied Franciscan Raymond RICAUT (master in theology at Paris about 1287/1288; d. 1296): GLOTT., II, 240-251. GLOREP., II, 124. V. Doucet, AFH., 27 (1934) 355. List of his Disputed Questions and of his Quodlibet in F. Delorme, *Quodlibets et Questions disputées de Raymond Ricaut, maître franciscain de Paris, d'après le Ms. 08 de la Bibl. Comm. de Todi*, ADGM., 826-841; text of the Prologue to Quodlibet VIII, 841.

⁴⁶ RICHARD OF MEDIAVILLA OFM. Called Richard of Middleton by those who consider him an Englishman, and Richard of Menneville, Moyenville etc., by those who consider him a Frenchman. Bachelor

in theology at Paris in 1283; full professor 1284-1287; IV Books on the *Sentences* completed after 1294; date of death unknown. GLOP, II, 120-123. V. Doucet, AFH., 27 (1934) 554-555. W. Lam- pen, *De manuscriptis Richardi de Mediavilla OFM.*, Antonianum 16 (1941) 45-52.

WRITINGS. In IV *libros Sententiarum*, Venice, 1507-1509; Brescia, 1591. *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, Venice, 1507, 1509; Paris, 1510, 1519, 1529; Brescia, 1591.—*Quaest. dispul.* 13, in *De humanae cognitionis ratione*, 221-245.—*Quaestio Fratris Richardi De gradu formarum*, in R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la conversione sur la pluralité des formes*, Louvain, 1951, pp. 35-169, 173-180.—BIBLIOGRAPHY. GDP., 762-763, E. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton, sa vie, ses oeuvres*, sa doctrine, Louvain (fundamental). Particular studies: W. Witterbruch, *Die Gewissenstheorie bei Heinrich von Ghent und Richard von Mediavilla*, Elberfeld, 1929. P. Rucker, *Der Ursprung unserer Begriffe nach Richard von Mediavilla*, Münster i. W., 1934 (Beiträge, 31, 1). J. Reuss, *Die theologische Tugend der Liebe nach der Lehre des Richard von Mediavilla*, FS., 22 (1935) 11-43, 158-198. O. Lotin, PEM., II, 247-249.—The above-mentioned work of Zavalloni is a necessary complement to Hocedez; chronological table, 595-597; extensive bibliography, 508-538; text of a question tentatively attributed to Richard, *De unitate formarum*; the question *De gradu formarum* is one of the origins of the discussions on the possibility and nature of variations of degree within one and the same order of forms; physics, metaphysics and theology were all interested in the question.

⁴⁷ The necessary texts are to be found in *De humanae cognitionis ratione* . . . pp. 221-245. The position of Richard is stated with perfect limpidity: 1) even if things are true by reason of their exemplars in God, one can know their truth without knowing their relation to their exemplar in God, p. 225; 2) what is naturally known is known in a "natural" light; we should carefully avoid introducing a supernatural light in this process, p. 226; now every natural power should be able to perform its natural operations, and since the natural operation of an intellectus is *intelligere*, our intellect must be able to perform this operation, pp. 226-227; there are only three ways to prove

Thomism without some Augustinian scruples. In saying that we can know "ali-quod verum," "ali-quod verum creatum," and even the eternal truth in a weak and confused way, he gives his reader the impression that, as he himself understands it, natural knowledge cannot pre-tend to the certitude it would have if it really did receive a supernatural illumination. We would not dare to at-tribute to him this intention if others (William of Ware for instance, see note 56) had not criticized him on this very point.

⁴⁸ E. Hocedez, op. cit., pp. 149-152. This indirect cognition of the singular is very different from the doctrine, classical in the Franciscan school, according to which we know the universal in a singular species and the singular in a singular species. Hocedez is right in saying that Richard is trying to follow Thomas with-out completely giving up the Franciscan tradition.

⁴⁹ Being is analogous, Hocedez, p. 183. Good is better than being, p. 185. God can be demonstrated from his effects; the argument of Saint Anselm is not conclu-sive, pp. 188-189. Existence is not an accident added to essence (against Avicenna seen by Thomas Aquinas); and it is not the act of essence, because, in order to be added to essence, it has to be, and since it could not be without being actu-ated by another *esse*, we would have to go *in infinitum*. What existence adds to essence can be nothing else than a rela-tion; Hocedez, pp. 189-190. Like Vital du Four, Richard defines it as the relation of the creature to the cause which gives it its existence. Like Olieu and Vital du Four, Richard is a witness to the contro-very concerning the composition of *essen-tia* and *esse*. Its origin is not Henry of Ghent (Hocedez, p. 397), but, rather, the very author of the distinction, namely, Thomas Aquinas. See P. Mandonnet, *Les premières disputes sur la distinction ré-elle*, RT., 18, (1910), p. 748; 1276 is about the time when the distinction be-came a controversial issue. Concerning Richard's own position see texts in Ho-cedez, pp. 397-401. Richard substantially agrees with Henry of Ghent; on the po-sition of Giles of Rome, pp. 402-407.

⁵⁰ On the hylomorphic composition of angels, texts in Hocedez, pp. 190-191 and

p. 257. On the debate then in progress on this question, see the remarkable Ap-pendix VII, in Hocedez, pp. 454-477, with the respective contributions of Henry of Ghent, Giles of Lessines and Giles of Rome to the controversy. A useful chron-ological table of the relevant writings, from 1275 up to 1288, follows in Ap-pendix VIII, pp. 478-479.

⁵¹ Richard distinguishes between a mat-ter which is *res pure possibilis*, and the matter which receives forms and is part of the composite. The first matter has no actuality of its own, but the second one has an inferior actuality, so much so that God could miraculously make it subsist apart from its form, pp. 191-192. The-ological reasons are backing this position. The first matter (pure possibility) is between actuality and nothingness. An extraordinary sentence says that it is transmuted into form: "Quod quidem principium pure possibile transmutatur in ipsam formam" (p. 193). Cf.: "Res pure possibilis transmutabilis in formam," *ibid*. It is not the matter of the composites, it is its potency. This, as Hocedez has clearly seen, enables Richard to find an answer to the question: in what sense are forms educed from the potency of mat-ter? (Hocedez, pp. 195-199). The "thing" purely possible transmutable into form looks like a substitute for the seminal reasons.—On the plurality of forms in man, texts in Hocedez, pp. 200-204; in Zavalloni, pp. 343-374; text of Richard, op. cit., 68-110. On the transition from Richard to Duns Scotus, Zavalloni, pp. 374-381.

⁵² E. Hocedez, p. 162. See P. Duhem, *Léonard de Vinci, ceux qu'il a lus, ceux qui l'ont lu*, II, 368-372, 411-412; III, 274-275; *Le système du monde*, III, 484-488, and the penetrating remark of Ho-cedez, p. 161, that "it is in order to save the omnipotence of God that Richard has formulated his thesis on the infinite." On the possibility for God to impart to the farthest heaven a movement of transla-tion, and on the laws of motion, Hocedez, pp. 163-167.—On the void and on infinite space, A. Koyré, *Le vide et l'espace infini au XIV^e siècle*, AHDL., 17 (1949) 67-75.

⁵³ Hocedez, p. 386. At the time of Richard, the Franciscan school finds itself challenged by new doctrines, including Thomism; it is on the defensive and must

often consent to yield some ground, but the school is not dead:

I. GONSALVUS HISPANUS (Gonsalvus of Balboa, de Valle Bona), master of Duns Scotus at Paris, d. 1313. GLOREP., II, 194-195. His *Conclusiones Metaphysicae Aristotelis* have been published under the name of Duns Scotus (Wadding, IV, 463-495; Vivès, VI, 601-667). Fr. Gonsalvi Hispani OFM., *Quaestiones disputatae et de Quodlibet*, by L. Amorós OFM., Quaracchi, 1925; excellent introduction, pp. LXV-LXXVI.—Gonsalvus upholds hylo-morphism in both angel and man; matter is the same in all beings in which there is matter (Qu., II, pp. 213-216). Plurality of forms in man (Qu., II, 282). There is in man a *forma mixta* (Qu., II, 286-290). Extension of the plurality of forms to all other beings (Qu., II, pp. 290-305). Identity of the powers of the soul with its essence (Qu., II, pp. 165-171). Against the separate intellects of Averroes (Qu., II, pp. 257-258); Gonsalvus grants to the soul a possible intellect but posits the agent intellect as separate. This is "Platonis opinio et Augustini et Avicennae"; but Avicenna identifies this separate intellect with an Intelligence inferior to God, which is wrong, whereas Plato and Augustine identify the agent intellect with God, which is right. They do not use the expression *intellectus agens*, but they say "light" (p. 258). Objection: but then the *moderni doctores* contradict Augustine in agreeing to attribute an agent intellect to the human soul (*cum ergo doctores moderni concorditer ponant*); answer: "Besides the particular light of the soul called agent intellect, the moderns posit a universal uncreated light illuminating every man that comes into this world, and therefore they do not contradict Augustine," p. 259. Besides, this is the position of Aristotle, p. 262. These two intellects (agent and possible) are one single power of the soul, p. 265. The will is not determined by the intellect (Qu., III, pp. 30-41); it can act against the judgment of the intellect at all times (Qu., III, pp. 124-131; recalls the articles condemned in 1277). Freedom is in the will (Qu., III, pp. 230-242). The will is more noble than the intellect (Qu., III, pp. 52-67). Except the divine illumination understood under this somewhat crude form, all these positions, slightly modified, will survive in the Scotist school.

II. Another representative of the first Franciscan school, successor of Gonsalvus

Hispanus as General Minister of the Franciscan Order in 1313, is ALEXANDER OF ALESSANDRIA (d. 1314). His commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, has been printed at Venice, in 1572, under the name of Alexander of Hales. His commentary on the *De anima*, Oxford, 1544. Commentary on the *Sentences* (2, redactions, before 1303 and after 1309). *Quodlibet* and a *Summa questionum Bonaventurae in IV libros Sententiarum* are still unpublished. GLOLET., II, 56; GLOREP., II, 199-202. V. Douvillé AFH., 27 (1934) 558-561.—A short treatment in *De humanae cognitionis* Quaracchi, 1883, pp. 219-226, identifies the agent intellect of man with the agent intellect of God: "Dicendum quod si in dem veritatem cognoscimus, hoc non nisi eadem luce aeterna, non per eamdem creatam, sed incretam. Istaliquid in anima dicitur intellectus agens, et cum hoc anima habeat aliquam creatam." His doctrine of the intellect said to resemble that of Peckham, this little studied theologian, set out by Veuthey OFM., *Alexandre d'Alexandre maître de l'Université de Paris et maître général des Frères Mineurs*, Etudes cisterciennes 43 (1931) 145-176, 319-344 (1932), 21-42, 193-207, 321-336, 449 (good doctrinal introduction). Alexander has been identified as the source of the red's distinction of essence and existence. Corn. Fabro, *Una fonte anticomunista metafisica suareziana*, DTP., 50 (1937) 57-68. A rather passionate reply by Cenal, *Alejandro de Alejandria: su metafísica en la metafísica de Suarez*, Pensamiento (1948) 91-122, establishes the fact that many so-called "Thomists" have forgotten the position of Thomas on this point, a point which C. Fabro has fairly no intention to deny.—On formal distinction, B. Jansen, *Beitrag zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der tinctionis formalis*, ZKT., 53 (1939) 544.

54 WILLIAM OF WARE OFM. (*Guarro*), dates of birth and death known; certainly a Franciscan; seen to have been one of the teachers of Scotus at the University of Paris, 1293.—GLOREP., II, 144-145. V. Douvillé AFH., 27 (1934) 558. H. Klug, *Zur Biographie der Minderbrüder Johannes Scotus und Wilhelm von Ware*, ZKT. (1915) 377-385. A. Daniels, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Wilhelm von*

und Johannes. Duns Scotus, FS., 4 (1917) 221-238. Fr. Palster, *Handschriftliches zu Scotus mit neuen Angaben über sein Leben*, FS., 10 (1923) 2-6.—Texts in A. Daniels, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen* . . . 90-104 (proofs of the existence of God). Same author, *Wilhelm von Ware über das menschliche Erkennen*, in Festgabe Cl. Baumecker, Beiträge, Suppl. I, Münster i. W., 309-318 (intellectual knowledge). P. Muscat, *Guillelmi de Ware questio inedita de unitate Dei*, Antonianum, 2 (1927) 335-350. Ath. Ledoux, *De gratia creata et increta iuxta Quaestionem ineditam Guillelmi de Ware*, Antonianum, 5 (1930) 148-156. A theological question on the immaculate conception is found in Fr. Guillelmi Guarrae . . . *Quaestiones disputatae de Imm. Conc. B. M. Virginis*, Quaracchi, 1904, I-11.—On the doctrine: E. Longpré, *Guillaume de Ware*, La France Franciscaine, 6 (1922) 1-22. H. Spettmann, *Die philosophische Schichtliche Stellung des Wilhelms von Ware*, PJ., 40 (1927) 401-413; 41 (1928) 42-49. J. Lechner, *Beiträge zum mittelalterlichen Franziskanerschriftum, vornehmlich der Oxforder Schule des 13/14. Jahrh., auf Grund einer Florentiner Wilhelm von Ware-Hs.*, FS., 19 (1932) 1-12. E. Magrini, *La produzione letteraria di Guglielmo di Ware*, Miscellanea Francescana 36 (1936) 312-322, and 38 (1938) 411-429. J. Lechner, *Die mehrfachen Fassungen des Sentenzenkommentars des Wilhelm von Ware OFM.*, FS., 31 (1949) 14-31.

55 A. Daniels has published qu. XIX of the commentary of William on the *Sentences*. His argument follows the same line as that of Richard of Mediavilla: "Scit natura non deficit in necessariis" as Augustine and Aristotle say "sic nec Deus," op. cit., p. 313. Yet, the next argument seems to be directed, among other men (Henry of Ghent?) against Richard, who had distinguished between two cognitions of truth: an imperfect one, for which natural light suffices, and a perfect one, which requires a divine illumination (pp. 313). William's own conclusion is that our natural light enables us to know, not only "certain things" with certitude (see Richard), but all things: "Unde concedendum quod anima potest videre aliqua, imo omnia naturaliter cognoscibilia mediante lumine naturali sine aliquo lumine supernaturali, subposita divina influentia generali," p. 316. This confirms the restrictive interpretation of the conclusion of Richard suggested by us in note 47. At the very moment he leaves Augustine and goes over to Thomas, William finds a consolation in defending Augustine against Thomas; compare William, p. 318, and Thomas, *Sum. theol.*, I, 84, 5. Resp. If, William says, Thomas had taken the Retractions of Augustine into account, he would have known that, at the end of his life, Augustine has given up the doctrine of the divine illumination. In short, Augustine died a Thomist.—With respect to the nature of the soul, William denies the existence of a spiritual matter and, consequently, the hylo-morphic composition of angels and souls (see H. Spettmann, PJ., 1928, 42-43).—On the unity of the powers of the soul with its substance, pp. 44-45.—On the primacy of nobility of the will in William of Ware

56 On the existence of God, see William's *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*, qu. XIV; text in Aug. Daniels, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen* . . . pp. 90-104. The proofs are given following six ways: movement (Aristotle and Averroes), order of causes (Aristotle), order of the universe (Aristotle and Damascene), imperfection of beings (Anselm, *Monolog.* I), possibility and necessity (R. of S. Victor, *De Trinit.*, I, 8, and Avicenna), presence of immutable truths in our minds (Augustine). Following an already Scotist order, William then proves the infinity of God (as pure act), p. 93, whence his omnipotence follows, pp. 93-95. Note, however, that the argument he uses p. 94 (there is an infinite distance from non-being to actual being) will be rejected by Scotus. On God's existence as a *per se nota* proposition, 98-104.—On the question of the oneness of God, William is of opinion that it cannot be

(his so-called "voluntarism") op. cit., pp. 46-49.

On another Franciscan master, contemporary with William, namely JOHN OF MURRO, see GLOPPEP, II, 125-126. E. Longpré, *L'oeuvre scolastique du cardinal Jean de Murro OFM.* (d. 1312), MAP., 467-492. O. Lottin, PEM., III, 513-514, 648-649, notes. Against the attribution to Murro of the Commentary on the *Sentences*, Paris Nat. Lat. 16407: O. Lottin, *Le Commentaire des Sentences de Jean de Murro est-il trouvé?*, RHE., 44 (1949) 153-172.

⁸⁰ RAMON LULL (*Lullius*, *Lullius*) birth date unknown (1232/1235?) born at Palma de Mayorca, of a Catalan family; attached to the courts of Jaime I of Aragon, then of Jaime II of Mayorca, married in 1256 and lived a free courtly life up to the time of his "conversion" (1262). From that time on he devoted himself to the missionary work which became his main interest in life. All his activities were related to it: foundation of the college of Miramar (Mayorca); missionary work in Asia (1279), in Armenia (1302), in Africa (1280, 1293, 1306, 1314); last, not least, the writing of Latin works (including those related to the "Great Art") all of them concerned with the propagation of the faith. His reputation was such that, without having obtained any degree in theology at the University of Paris, he was permitted to teach his doctrine there three times (1287-1289, 1297-1299, 1300-1311). After a last missionary voyage to Africa, during which he was tortured for the faith, he died on the ship (1316) on his way back to Mayorca. Lull is said to have joined the Third-Order of Saint Francis in 1292. The relics of Blessed Ramon Lull are the object of public veneration in the church of San Francisco de Palma in Mayorca. Incidentally, the American city of San Francisco derives its name from this church and the adjoining Franciscan monastery, whose missionaries were its first founders. See GLOPPEP, II, 146-191. E. Longpré, art. *Raymond Lulle*, DTC., 9 (1926) 1072-1141. E. A. Allison Peers, *Ramon Lull, A Biography*, London, 1929 (fundamental). A necessary document is the short anonymous *Vida coetanea*, ed. F. de Moll, Palma de Mallorca, 1935.—Still deserving to be consulted, E. Littré *Raymond Lulle*, HLF., 29 (1835) 1-386;

pages 1-67 are a biography of Lull by Haureau.

WRITINGS. B. *Raymundi Lullii Opera* . . . by Y. Salinger, 8 vol. Mainz, 1721-1742; on the history of the edition, A. Gottron, FS., 3 (1916) 235, 379-396.—Separate works: *Libri Immaculata Beatissime Virginis Conceptione*, ed. J. Avinyó, Barcelona, 1909. *Declaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita contra aliquorum philosophorum eorum sequacium opiniones erroneas damnatas a venerabili patre et domini episcopo Parisiensi: seu liber contra rores Boethii et Sigerii*, in Otto Keicher, *Raymundus Lullus und seine Stellung in arabischen Philosophie*, Münster, 1909 (Beiträge, 7, 4-5). C. Ottaviani, *L'ars compendiosa de R. Lulle*, Paris, 1930.—F. Stegmüller, *De ostensione quam fides catholica est probabilis demonstrabilis*; P. Gálcsics, *De virtutibus*; J. Giers, *De Deo majore et de minore*; S. Galmès, *Ars infusa*, in *Studia Monographica*, Lullist School of Mediaeval Studies, VII-VIII, Mallorca, 1952. Lull of Lull to the University of Paris, the study of Oriental languages, UN., 125-127.—The Catalan writings of Lull are mainly concerned with contemplative and mystical life; bibliography in Allison Peers, 425-426; English translation, 426. Fr. Sureda Blanes, *Bases críticas del pensamiento Lulliano*, (Mallorca?) 1935; bibliography, 23-35. M. B. Llori, *Introducción bibliográfica a los estudios lullianos*, Palma de Mallorca, 1945. Bibliographical bulletin: *Studia Lullistica et recensiones*, Schöo Lullist Studies, Palma de Mallorca, ff.

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⁸¹ O. Keicher (*Raymundus Lullus*

pp. 62-71) rightly stresses the importance of Averroism as a determining factor of Lull's attitude concerning the relation of reason and faith. See the text where a Saracen king answers the Christian missionary: "I do not want to exchange belief for belief, but for understanding," p. 63, n. 2. Again: "A clever man is more likely to be led to truth by reasons than by faith and authorities," p. 64, n. 2. Again: "It is better for a man to demonstrate the truth to the intellect of his adversary than to force him to confess it without having been conducted to it and convinced of it," p. 64, n. 4. Nevertheless, Lull never thought that the mysteries of faith could be really demonstrated; like all theologians of his time, he wanted to support them by reasons and to show that none of them could be demonstrated to be false.

⁸² Lull's *Declaratio per modum dialogi* (ed. O. Keicher) is explicitly directed against the 219 articles condemned by E. Tempier in 1277 (op. cit., p. 95). The stage is set in a forest near Paris and Socrates obviously represents the "philosophers" who maintained that these propositions were true according to philosophy (94-95). Hence the 219 chapters of the dialogue, each of which answers one of the 219 condemned propositions. Ramon begins by enumerating the "principles" of his "table" and persuades Socrates to accept the rules of his own recently discovered method of discussion. Then he defines what he calls "the common opinions of all the great philosophers," and, first of all: "That God exists, that he is the prime cause and that the whole world is his effect in its universality as well as in each one of its parts," etc. (98-99). When Socrates is not fully convinced, for instance concerning the Trinity, Ramon refers him to one of his other works. (cf. ch. XVI, p. 118) in which, however, he does not pretend that he has convinced Socrates of the necessity of faith; Socrates simply answers that he will try to see if his intellect assents to Ramon's words and if he feels love for them in his will, p. 120. Nevertheless, ch. XXXVI, Ramon considers Socrates as bound by an assent he has not given, op. cit., p. 138.

⁸³ This is the eighth rule of the *Ars Magica* (O. Keicher, p. 99). Socrates assents to it, as to many other ones, and

he could not do differently, since everything Ramon has said is evident, p. 101. Some among the answers of Ramon throw a vivid light on the reasons for the condemnation of certain articles. For instance: VII, "That the human intellect is not the act of the body, except as the pilot is that of his ship," etc.; because this favors the doctrine of the separate agent intellect (pp. 110-111). XI, "That man is man apart from the rational soul"; same reason. (pp. 113-115). XIII and XIV, likewise condemned as threatening the substantial unity of man (pp. 116-117). XXII, "That God cannot give felicity to a man without giving it to another man"; rejected as presupposing that beings flow from God with necessity. XXVII, "That God could not make more than one soul"; same answer (pp. 130-131). XLIX, "That God could not move the heavens by a straight motion, because, otherwise, there would be a void left"; his own answer to this article (p. 143) remarkably illustrates what has been said in this chapter about Richard of Middleton. On several other points (chapters, 70, 87, 118 (separate agent intellect), 168 (continence not necessary), the explanations provided by Socrates help in ascertaining the meaning of the condemned propositions in the minds of the "philosophers." Ramon's remark (p. 220) on the "venerabiles domini mei theologi sive doctores in theologia, qui sunt columnae sanctae fidei christianae," vividly illustrates the remarks of M.-D. Chenu, *Introduction* . . . , 18-19, on the new status acquired in the Church by the theologians. In the twelfth century, the sentence of Ramon could not have been written. The answer of Socrates: "Let us go to Paris and present our book to these venerable Masters, so that it be corrected by them" (p. 221) is little more likely in the mouth of an Averroist than in that of the real Socrates. But what Ramon himself desired was to reconcile the masters of the two faculties; that is, the *venerabiles magistri regentes Parisienses in philosophia* and their colleagues in the Faculty of Theology. This seems to have been for him one more personal mission to fulfill: "quia bonum zelum habui et multum desidero magnam concordantiam esse inter dominos meos magistros in theologia et in philosophia," p. 221.

⁸⁴ An important witness to the later influence of R. Lull is the *Liber creatura-*

⁶⁸ ROBERT KILWARDBY OP (d. 1279): Most of his published texts are included in studies on his life and doctrine: GDP, 764. L. Baur, *Dominicus Gundissalinus De divisione philosophiae*, 359–375. Letter to Peter of Confans, Fr. Ehrle, *Der Augustinus und der Aristotelismus in der*

with an excellent re-exposition of the doctrine of the plurality of forms, *ibid.*, 63-64. This seventh point is the object of the discussion of Giles of Lessines in his own treatise *De unitate formarum*. See Part IX, ch. 4, note 90. A large number of variants and corrections to the text of the Letter published by Ehrle is to be found in A. Birkenmajer, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-64.

⁷⁴ What is known of the other writings of Kilwardby confirms the stability of the positions upheld in the answer to Peter of Conflans: hylomorphism (Sharp, NS, 9 (1935), 41, 47-52); self-individualization of the composite (*ibid.*, 53-54); reduction of the powers of the soul to its substance: Stegmüller, *AHDL.*, 10-11 (1936) 365; on the unity of knowledge and love, or *aspectus* and *affectus*, *ibid.*, 370-374; active nature of sense knowledge, *ibid.*, 401, and Chenu, *RSPT.*, 15 (1926) 510-511; on the two memories: that of Aristotle for received sensible species and that of Augustine for intelligible species, *ibid.*, 366, 377-380, 394, the divine illumination being unknown to Augustine, Sharp, NS, 9 (1935) 42-43. The doctrine of the memory of the past species (Aristotle) should be related to that of imagination (the *spiritus imaginativus*), Chenu, *RSTP.*, 15 (1926) 509-510.

⁷⁵ P. Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci* . . . , II, 411-412.

⁷⁶ P. Duhem, *op. cit.*, III, p. xi.

⁷⁷ M.-D. Chenu, *Les réponses de saint Thomas et de Robert Kilwardby* . . . , MM, 1, 191-222.

⁷⁸ JOHN PECKHAM OFM. (d. 1292). GLOLIT., II, 173-180. GLOREP., II, 87-98: biography, 87; scientific writings (including the *Perspectiva communis*), 87-88; commentary on *I Sent.*, 88 h. Cf. V. Doucet, *AFH.*, 27 (1934) 548-549. Correspondence of Peckham: *Registrum epistolatum fr. Johannis Peckham*, ed. C. T. Martin, London, 3 vols. 1882-1885.—H. Spettmann, *Johannis Peckham Quaestiones tractantes de anima*, Münster i. W., 1918 (Beiträge, 19, 5-6); *Die Psychologie des Johannes Peckham*, Münster i. W., 1919 (Beiträge, 20, 6). More texts in *De humanae cognitionis ratione* (Quodl., II, 4) 179-182; H. Spettmann, *DTF.*, 5 (1927) 327-345; A. Daniels, *Quellenbei-*

one); c) a matter common to terrestrial elements and to their compounds (Ehrle, 616-617; compare the first matter with the "pure possibility" of Richard of Mediavilla): the first two matters are studied in metaphysics, the third one in physics (note, p. 620, *Denique verba* . . .), that Peter of Conflans himself seemed to grant the presence of a pseudo-Aristotelean inchoation of active form in matter; 3, privation is not pure nothingness; it is one of the principles of generation, hence it cannot be nothing; 4, the generation of animals is not like the transformation of elements, otherwise dreadful moral consequences would follow (p. 622) and the transmigration of human souls could be maintained (p. 623); the "unreadable" word mentioned by Ehrle probably is *comparatus*; 5, there is in the embryo and in man only one substance, not several: because the three souls are essentially distinct, and "their primordial reasons have been inherent in the matter of transmutable things from the very beginning, so that, in consequence, they arise out of the works created by God, in virtue of his government of the world during the course of centuries" (p. 627). Naturally, the human soul is a single substance, yet it is composed of parts, as the Philosopher and Augustine agree (p. 628); 6, the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellectual souls are distinct substances: this is made evident by what precedes, and, besides, God alone is simple. The 7th article, unknown to Ehrle, has been published by A. Birkenmajer, *Der Brief Robert Kilwardby an Peter von Conflans und die Streitschrift des Aegidius von Lessines*, Münster i. W., 1922, pp. 60-64 (Beiträge, 20, 5). Kilwardby says that the so-called doctrine of the unity of form ("positio de unitate formae") is something unheard of to him and which he does not understand. It seems to mean that, on its arrival, the latest form takes up and exercises the operations formerly produced by the preceding ones, which are totally corrupted (Birkenmajer, 60). This is visibly false, since we see that, in any human body, flesh, bones, nerves, blood, eye, foot, all have their own forms (*ibid.*, 60). Again, if this were true, "nothing would be composed except of matter and form" (*ibid.*, 61). After accumulating arguments, both philosophical and theological (the body of Christ after his death and the Eucharist, 62-63), he concludes

general division of philosophy is as follows: I, Philosophy of divine things; natural, mathematical, metaphysical; II, Philosophy of human things: 1) Practical philosophy, that is, a) Ethics, personal, familial or public; b) Mechanical arts; 2), Logic.

⁷⁹ Kilwardby prohibited the teaching at Oxford of fourteen propositions pertaining to grammar and logic, among which: 6, that necessary truth requires the constancy of its object (wrong, since the divine cognition of contingents is necessarily true); 7, that there can be no demonstration except about existing beings (wrong, since demonstrations about non-existing essences are possible); 8, that every true proposition concerning the future is necessary (wrong, unless one takes into account the free decision of God to create a contingent). The sixteen following propositions (in "natural philosophy") concern the human soul and the seminal reasons; on these, see note 73. Text of the prohibition in *CUP.*, I, 558-559; cf. D. Sharp, *The 1277 Condemnation by Kilwardby*, NS, 8 (1934) 307-308, n. 2.

⁸⁰ The answer of Robert to Peter of Conflans limits itself to seven (out of the sixteen) condemned articles to whose prohibition Peter had taken exception. All these, Robert says, are both scientifically false and religiously untenable. He deals with them successively, but they all are related to the problem of the "seminal reasons." Robert sees no difficulty in reconciling this Augustinian doctrine with Aristotle if it is admitted that, according to the Philosopher, there is in matter something of the form, in short an "active potency" (text in Ehrle, 618). Whether this active potency is called "seminal reason" or not is of no importance. On the strength of this position, Robert Kilwardby successively maintains that: 1, in passing away the form is not corrupted into pure nothingness (because, since corruption is the opposite of generation, if the corruption of a form were an annihilation, its coming to be would be a creation); 2, there is an active potency in matter; for indeed, there are three matters, a) a matter common to both corporeal and spiritual substances; b) a matter common to both sublunary bodies (*recta*: i.e., moving along straight lines) and heavenly bodies (*circularia*: i.e., bodies whose natural motion is a circular

Scholastik gegen Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts, ALKM., 5 (1886) 614-632. Cf. Al. Birkenmajer, *Vermischte Untersuchungen*, Münster i. W., 1932, 36-60. (Beiträge, 20, 5.) M.-D. Chenu, *Le De spiritu imaginativo de Robert Kilwardby*, *RSPT.*, 15 (1926) 507-517; *Le De conscientia de Robert Kilwardby*, *RSPT.*, 16 (1927) 318-326; *Les réponses de saint Thomas et de Kilwardby à la consultation de Jean de Vercelli*, 1271, MM., 1930, I, 191-222; *Le traité De tempore de R. Kilwardby*, *ADGM.*, 1935, 855-861; *Aux origines de la "science moderne"*, *RSPT.*, 29 (1940) 206-217. F. Stegmüller, *Les questions du Commentaire des Sentences de Robert Kilwardby*, *RTAM.*, 6 (1934) 55-79, 215-228; *Robert Kilwardby OP. über die Möglichkeit der natürlichen Gottesliebe*, *DTP.*, 38 (1935) 306-319. D. E. Sharp, *Further Philosophical Doctrines of Kilwardby*, NS, 9 (1935) 39-65 (quotations from the Commentary); *The 1277 Condemnation of Kilwardby*, NS, 8 (1934) 306-318. Fr. Stegmüller, *Der Traktat des Robert Kilwardby OP. De imagine et vestigio Trinitatis*, *AHDL.*, 10 (1935-1936) 324-407. E. M. F. Sommer-Seckendorff, *Studies in the Life of Robert Kilwardby OP.*, Roma, 1937. D. A. Callus, *The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford*, Oxford, 1946, pp. 12-18; *The "Tabulae super originalia Patrum" of Robert Kilwardby OP.*, in *Studia Mediaevalia* (Miscellanea Martin), 1948, 243-270. Cf. *New Manuscripts of Kilwardby's Tabulae super originalia Patrum*, Dominican Studies, 2 (1949) 38-45.

⁸¹ The list of the commentaries on Aristotle ascribed to Kilwardby has not yet been critically established; see, however, valuable information on this point in Stegmüller, *RTAM.*, 6 (1934) 57-60; list of the questions contained in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, *ibid.*, 61-79 and 215-228. Cf. E.M.F. Sommer-Seckendorff, *Studies* . . . , 14-15.

⁸² On this treatise, see D. E. Sharp, *The "De ortu scientiarum" of Robert Kilwardby*, NS, 8 (1934) 1-30. E. M. F. Sommer-Seckendorff, *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 55 (1955) 312-324 (Festschrift-H. Finke). Also the older study of L. Baur, see n. 69. It is a classification of sciences in the tradition of the Victorines and of Gundissalinus. Mechanical arts are included in the classification (cf. Bonaventura, *De reductione arrium* . . .). The

träge . . . , 41-50. Kingsford, Little and Tocco, *Johannis Peckham . . . tractatus*, British Society of Franciscan Studies, II (1910) 121-147. *Summa de ente et essentia*, ed. F. Delorme, Studi Francescani, 25 (1928) 61-71. F. Delorme, *Johannis Peckham, Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis, Quodlibetum Romanum*, Roma, 1938. G. Melani, *Tractatus de anima Johannis Peckham*, Firenze, 1949; Appendix: *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 9. *Arithmetica mystica*, ch. 1-5. Question *On the Root of Constancy* (*Postilla Super Canonicam*). Florentine Quodlibet, quaest. 2-3, 5-6.

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⁷⁰ J. Peckham, *Registrum epistolarum . . .*, II, 871, 901-902. This text, together with the collection of Disputed Questions *De humanae cognitionis ratione* (which could be made much longer than it is) should dispose of the opinion that the problem of human knowledge was not a living issue, in the thirteenth century. Its properly metaphysical connotations have been masterfully summed up

by Thomas Aquinas in his *De veritate*, q. 11, a. 1, Resp.

⁷¹ The positions of Peckham conform to the *theologia communis* of the thirteenth century.—MATTER, can be created apart from form, *Quodl. rom.*, ed. Delorme, 2-5; created common to spiritual and to corporeal beings, *Qu. de anima*, ed. H. Spettmann, 8.—SOUL, its hylomorphic composition, *Qu. de anima*, 49-50; is a rational substance, *Tract. de anima*, 14, p. 47; the noblest of all spiritual forms, it is immortal, 15, pp. 48-51; cf. *Qu. de anima*, 23, 26 (ad 13m, noteworthy). Only one soul, *ibid.*, 36; yet with a threefold substance, *ibid.*, 37; presupposes corporeity as form of the body, *Quodl. rom.*, 62-64; united to the body through vital spirits, *Tract. de anima*, VII, 5, p. 27; its powers are rooted in its essence, *op. cit.*, p. 44: "Sed sciendum . . ."; the sensitive soul and its actions, sensation as an act, Florentine *Quodlibet*, II, in Melani, *Tract. de anima*, 147-149; Avicennian division of the intellects, G. Melani, in *Tract. de anima*, 86-87; on sensible and intelligible species, *Qu. de anima*, 84-87; on the self-knowledge of the soul by mode of presence, not of form, *Quodl. romanum*, 69-70.—GOD, on the demonstrations of the existence of God, *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, in Aug. Daniels, *Quellenbeilage . . .*, 41-50. The being of God is object of faith, but his existence is naturally known to man (ref. to Damascene, I, 1); this natural knowledge is confirmed by arguments drawn from creatures, but these arguments do not prevent it from being held by faith (p. 45). Moreover, since God in his own being, he cannot be conceived as non-existent, pp. 49-50.—A detailed study of Peckham's doctrinal positions remains a much needed desideratum.

⁷² "The agent intellect of which the Philosopher speaks is in no way part of the soul; rather, as I believe, it is God, who is the light of minds . . ." etc., in *Johannis Peckham qu. de anima*, ed. H. Spettmann, p. 73. Against Avicenna and Averroes, 49-52, 65. Against Thomas Aquinas, 66. For Augustine, 66-68.—*Quodlibetum romanum*, ed. F. Delorme, 11-13; note, p. 13: "However, this does not exclude the created light of the natural intellect. . . ."—*Tractatus de anima*, ed. G. Melani, ch. III, 9-12 (about 1271-1279, strictly Augustinian); historical commentary by Melani, pp. 109-115.

Cf. Appendix I, the question *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, pp. 131-138.

⁷³ For a striking specimen of this curious complex, see the *Arithmetica mystica*, in G. Melani, *Tractatus de anima*, Appendix II, pp. 138-144. It is strongly influenced by the *De musica* of Augustine, and Peckham does not forget the presence of the Platonic definitions of the soul (p. 144): a substance full of numbers, or, rather, a self-moving number: *Laws*, X, 895-896; *Phaedrus*, ch. 24.

⁷⁴ SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, F. M. Powicke, *Master Simon of Faversham*, Mélanges

PART EIGHT

CHAPTER III. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

⁷⁵ Plato, *Alcibiades*, 129. E. Plotinus, *Enneads*, I, 1, 3. Augustine, *De unitate animae*, XIII, 22; PL., 32, 1048, following positions: primacy of good and of will, substantial independence of the soul with respect to the body, seminal reasons, active nature of sense cognition. He denies the Augustinian character of the doctrine of divine illumination as taught by Bonaventure and Matthew of Aquasparta; he maintains that their notion of matter is more directly related to the doctrine of Aristotle. Such controversies are mostly about names.

⁷⁶ D. A. Callus, *The Condemnation . . .*, p. 4.

⁷⁷ *Sum. theol.*, II-II, 188, 5, ad 3m. On the authority of Augustine, *De musica* VI, conclusion; PL., 32, 1194.

⁷⁸ On the nature of theology and its relations to philosophical sciences, the fundamental text is *Summa theologiae*, Part I, qu. 1. The interpretation of these deceptively simple articles has given rise to many controversies. The ancient commentators, especially Bañez, should be consulted. In recent times: M.-D. Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle*, 2 éd., Paris, J. Vrin, 1943. Against the first article of Chenu on the question, AHDL., 2 (1927) 31-71: J.-Fr. Bonnefoy, *La nature de la théologie selon saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Ephemerides theol. logicae Lovanienses, 14 (1937) 421-446, 600-631; 15 (1938) 491-516; published

HISTORY OF Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages

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FOREWORD

THE aim and scope of this book is to provide general readers and students with an introduction to the history of Christian philosophy from Justin Martyr in the second century after Christ up to Nicholas of Cues whose work stands on the border line of a new historical period. We call Christian philosophy the use made of philosophical notions by the Christian writers of those times. Although it intends to convey some measure of literary information, the emphasis of this book is on philosophy itself; it is primarily concerned with the history of philosophical ideas even though, as is generally the case in the middle ages, philosophy is only found in a theological context.

The text itself represents, we hope, a sufficient introduction to the significant developments that took place during the fourteen centuries under consideration. The notes should provide teachers and advanced students with the first technical information they need in order to conduct their courses or to start their own research work. Special bibliographies, indicated in our own, will take them to the relevant sources of information.

The indebtedness of the author to his predecessors cannot be adequately expressed. Our bibliographies will say it better than any literary formulas. Another feeling of indebtedness is still less easy to convey. This *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* has been entirely taught and written at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, in Toronto. Without the specialized library created twenty-five years ago by the insight and generosity of the Congregation of Saint Basil, we could not have attempted to write it. Without the patience and zeal of so many students whose personal reactions have always been constructive, we would not have dared to teach it. Without the constant good will of colleagues whose criticism has always been at our disposal, this book would have been still more imperfect than it is. We beg to extend to all, fellow historians, students and colleagues, the heartfelt expression of our gratitude.

E. G.

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Censor Deputatus

IMPRIMATUR

✠ JAMES C. CARDINAL MCGUIGAN, D.D.
Archbishop of Toronto

September 29, 1954, the Feast of St. Michael
the Archangel

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